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Abstract
If we replace first order logic by second order logic in the original def-
inition of Go¨del’s inner model L, we obtain HOD ([32]). In this paper we
consider inner models that arise if we replace first order logic by a logic that
has some, but not all, of the strength of second order logic. Typical examples
are the extensions of first order logic by generalized quantifiers, such as the
Magidor-Malitz quantifier ([23]), the cofinality quantifier ([34]), or station-
ary logic ([6]). Our first set of results show that both L and HOD manifest
some amount of formalism freeness in the sense that they are not very sen-
sitive to the choice of the underlying logic. Our second set of results shows
that the cofinality quantifier gives rise to a new robust inner model between
L and HOD. We show, among other things, that assuming a proper class of
Woodin cardinals the regular cardinals > ℵ1 of V are weakly compact in
the inner model arising from the cofinality quantifier and the theory of that
model is (set) forcing absolute and independent of the cofinality in question.
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We do not know whether this model satisfies the Continuum Hypothesis, as-
suming large cardinals, but we can show, assuming three Woodin cardinals
and a measurable above them, that if the construction is relativized to a real,
then on a cone of reals the Continuum Hypothesis is true in the relativized
model.
1 Introduction
Inner models, together with the forcing method, are the basic building blocks used
by set theorists to prove relative consistency results on the one hand and to try to
chart the “true” universe of set theory V on the other hand.
The first and best known, also the smallest of the inner models is Go¨del’s L,
the universe of constructible sets. An important landmark among the largest inner
models is the universe of hereditarily ordinal definable sets HOD, also introduced
by Go¨del1. In between these two extremes there is a variety of inner models arising
from enhancing Go¨del’s L by normal ultrafilters on measurable cardinals, or in a
more general case extenders, something that L certainly does not have itself.
We propose a construction of inner models which arise not from adding normal
ultrafilters, or extenders, to L, but by changing the underlying construction of L.
We show that the new inner models have similar forcing absoluteness properties
as L(R), but at the same time they satisfy the Axiom of Choice.
Go¨del’s hierarchy of constructible sets is defined by reference to first order
1Go¨del introduced HOD in his 1946 Remarks before the Princeton Bicenntenial conference on
problems in mathematics [12]. The lecture was given during a session on computability organized
by Alfred Tarski, and in it Go¨del asks whether notions of definability and provability can be
isolated in the set-theoretic formalism, which admit a form of robustness similar to that exhibited
by the notion of general recursiveness: “Tarski has stressed in his lecture the great importance
(and I think justly) of the concept of general recursiveness (or Turing computability). It seems
to me that this importance is largely due to the fact that with this concept one has succeeded in
giving an absolute definition of an interesting epistemological notion, i.e. one not depending on
the formalism chosen. In all other cases treated previously, such as definability or demonstrability,
one has been able to define them only relative to a given language, and for each individual language
it is not clear that the one thus obtained is not the one looked for. For the concept of computability
however. . . the situation is different. . . This, I think, should encourage one to expect the same thing
to be possible also in other cases (such as demonstrability or definability).”
Go¨del contemplates the idea that constructibility might be a suitable analog of the notion of
general recursiveness. Go¨del also considers the same for HOD, and predicts the consistency of the
axiom V = HOD + 2ℵ0 > ℵ1 (proved later by McAloon [28]). See [14] for a development of
Go¨del’s proposal in a “formalism free” direction.
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definability. Sets on a higher level are the first order definable sets of elements of
lower levels. The inner model L enjoys strong forcing absoluteness: truth in L
cannot be changed by forcing, in fact not by any method of extending the universe
without adding new ordinals. Accordingly, it is usually possible to settle in L, one
way or other, any set theoretical question which is otherwise independent of ZFC.
However, the problem with L is that it cannot have large cardinals on the level
of the Erdo˝s cardinal κ(ω1) or higher. To remedy this, a variety of inner models,
most notably the smallest inner model Lµ with a measurable cardinal, have been
introduced (see e.g. [37]).
We investigate the question to what extent is it essential that first order defin-
ability is used in the construction of Go¨del’s L. In particular, what would be the
effect of changing first order logic to a stronger logic? In fact there are two prece-
dents: Scott and Myhill [32] showed that if first order definability is replaced by
second order definability the all-encompassing class HOD of hereditarily ordinal
definable sets is obtained. The inner model L is thus certainly sensitive to the
definability concept used in its construction. The inner model HOD has consis-
tently even supercompact cardinals [29]. However, HOD does not solve any of
the central independent statements of set theory; in particular, it does not solve
the Continuum Hypothesis or the Souslin Hypothesis [28].
A second precedent is provided by Chang [7] in which first order definability
was replaced by definability in the infinitary languageLω1ω1 , obtaining what came
to be known as the Chang model. Kunen [17] showed that the Chang model fails
to satisfy the Axiom of Choice, if the existence of uncountably many measurable
cardinals is assumed. We remark that the inner model L(R) arises in the same
way if Lω1ω is used instead of Lω1ω1 . Either way, the resulting inner model fails
to satisfy the Axiom of Choice if enough large cardinals are assumed. This puts
these inner models in a different category. On the other hand, the importance
of both the Chang model and L(R) is accentuated by the result of Woodin [41]
that under large cardinal assumptions the first order theory of the Chang model, as
well as of L(R), is absolute under set forcing. So there would be reasons to expect
that these inner models would solve several independent statements of set theory,
e.g. the CH. However, the failure of the Axiom of Choice in these inner models
dims the light such “solutions” would shed on CH. For example, assuming large
cardinals, the model L(R) satisfies the statement “Every uncountable set of reals
contains a perfect subset”, which under AC would be equivalent to CH . On the
other hand, large cardinals imply that there is in L(R) a surjection from R onto
ω2, which under AC would imply ¬CH .
In this paper we define analogs of the constructible hierarchy by replacing first
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order logic in Go¨del’s construction by any one of a number of logics. The inner
models HOD, L(R) and the Chang model are special cases, obtained by replacing
first order definability by definability in L2, Lω1ω and Lω1ω1 , respectively. Our
main focus is on extensions of first order logic by generalized quantifiers in the
sense of Mostowski [30] and Lindstro¨m [21]. We obtain new inner models which
are L-like in that they are models of ZFC and their theory is absolute under set
forcing, but at the same time these inner models contain large cardinals, or inner
models with large cardinals.
The resulting inner models enable us to make distinctions in set theory that
were previously unknown. However, we also think of the arising inner models as a
tool to learn more about extended logics. As it turns out, for many non-equivalent
logics the inner model is the same. In particular for many non-elementary logics
the inner model is the same as for first order logic. We may think that such logics
have some albeit distant similarity to first order logic. On the other hand, some
other logics give rise to the inner model HOD. We may say that they bear some
resemblance to second order logic.
Our main results can be summarized as follows:
(A) For the logics L(Qα) we obtain just L, for any choice of α. If 0# exists the
same is true of the Magidor-Malitz logics L(QMMα ).
(B) If 0♯ exists the cofinality quantifier logic L(Qcfω ) yields a proper extension C
∗
of L. But C∗ 6= HOD if there are uncountably many measurable cardinals.
(C) If there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals, then regular cardinals > ℵ1 are
Mahlo and indiscernible in C∗, and the theory of C∗ is invariant under (set)
forcing.
(D) The Dodd-Jensen Core Model is contained in C∗. If there is an inner model
with a measurable cardinal, then such an inner model is also contained in
C∗.
(E) If there is a Woodin cardinal and a measurable cardinal above it, then CH is
true in the version C∗(x) of C∗, obtained by allowing a real parameter x,
for a cone of reals x.
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2 Basic concepts
We define an analogue of the constructible hierarchy of Go¨del by replacing first
order logic in the construction by an arbitrary logic L∗. We think of logics in
the sense of Lindstro¨m [22], Mostowski [31], Barwise [4], and the collection [2].
What is essential is that a logic L∗ has two components i.e. L∗ = (S∗, T ∗), where
S∗ is the class of sentences of L∗ and T ∗ is the truth predicate of L∗. We usually
write ϕ ∈ L∗ for ϕ ∈ S∗ andM |= ϕ for T ∗(M, ϕ). We can talk about formulas
with free variables by introducing new constant symbols and letting the constant
symbols play the role of free variables. The classes S∗ and T ∗ may be defined with
parameters, as in the case of Lκλ, where κ and λ can be treated as parameters. A
logic L∗ is a sublogic of another logic L+, L∗ ≤ L+, if for every ϕ ∈ S∗ there is
ϕ+ ∈ S+ such that for all M: M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ M |= ϕ+. We assume that our
logics have first order order logic as sublogic.
Example 2.1. 1. First order logic Lωω (or FO) is the logic (S∗, T ∗), where S∗
is the set of first order sentences and T ∗ is the usual truth definition for first
order sentences.
2. Infinitary logic Lκλ, where κ and λ ≤ κ are regular cardinals, is the logic
(S∗, T ∗), where S∗ consists of the sentences built inductively from conjunc-
tions and disjunctions of length< κ of sentences of Lκλ, and homogeneous
strings of existential and universal quantifiers of length < λ in front of for-
mulas of Lκλ. The class T ∗ is defined in the obvious way. We allow also
the case that κ or λ is ∞. We use Lωκλ to denote that class of formulae of
Lκλ with only finitely many free variables.
3. The logic L(Q) with a generalized quantifier Q is the logic (S∗, T ∗), where
S∗ is obtained by adding the new quantifierQ to first order logic. The exact
syntax depends on the type of Q, (see our examples below). The class T ∗ is
defined by first fixing the defining model class KQ of Q and then defining
T ∗ by induction on formulas:
M |= Qx1, . . . , xnϕ(x1, . . . , xn,~b) ⇐⇒
(M, {(a1, . . . , an) ∈M
n :M |= ϕ(a1, . . . , an,~b)}) ∈ KQ.
Thought of in this way, the defining model class of the existential quantifier
is the class K∃ = {(M,A) : ∅ 6= A ⊆ M}, and the defining model class of
the universal quantifier is the class K∀ = {(M,A) : A = M}. Noting that
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the generalisations of ∃ with defining class {(M,A) : A ⊆ M, |A| ≥ n},
where n is fixed, are definable in first order logic, Mostowski [30] intro-
duced the generalisations Qα of ∃ with defining class
KQα = {(M,A) : A ⊆M, |A| ≥ ℵα}.
Many other generalized quantifiers are known today in the literature and we
will introduce some important ones later.
4. Second order logic L2 is the logic (S∗, T ∗), where S∗ is obtained from first
order logic by adding variables for n-ary relations for all n and allowing
existential and universal quantification over the new variables. The class T ∗
is defined by the obvious induction. In this inductive definition of T ∗ the
second order variables range over all relations of the domain (and not only
e.g. over definable relations).
We now define the main new concept of this paper:
Definition 2.2. Suppose L∗ is a logic. IfM is a set, let DefL∗(M) denote the set
of all sets of the form X = {a ∈ M : (M,∈) |= ϕ(a,~b)}, where ϕ(x, ~y) is an
arbitrary formula of the logic L∗ and ~b ∈ M . We define a hierarchy (L′α) of sets
constructible using L∗ as follows:
L′0 = ∅
L′α+1 = DefL∗(L
′
α)
L′ν =
⋃
α<ν L
′
α for limit ν
We use C(L∗) to denote the class
⋃
α L
′
α.
Thus a typical set in L′α+1 has the form
X = {a ∈ L′α : (L
′
α,∈) |= ϕ(a,~b)} (1)
where ϕ(x, ~y) is a formula of L∗ and ~b ∈ L′α. It is important to note that ϕ(x, ~y)
is a formula of L∗ in the sense of V , not in the sense of C(L∗), i.e. we assume
S∗(ϕ(x, ~y)) is true rather than being true in (L′α,∈). In extensions of first order
logic of the form L(Q) this is not a problem because being a formula is absolute
to high degree. For example, in a countable vocabulary we have Go¨del-numbering
for the set of formulas of L(Q) which renders the set of Go¨del-numbers of formu-
las primitive recursive. On the other hand, the set of formulas of Lω1ω is highly
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non-absolute, because an infinite conjunctionmay be uncountable inL′α but count-
able in V . Also, note that (L′α,∈) |= ϕ(a,~b) refers to T
∗ in the sense of V , not
in the sense of C(L∗). This is a serious point. For example, if ϕ(a,~b) compares
cardinalities or cofinalities of a,~b to each other, the witnessing mappings do not
have to be in L′α.
By definition, C(Lωω) = L. Myhill-Scott [32] showed that C(L2) = HOD
(See Theorem 7.1 below). Chang [7] considered C(Lω1ω1) and pointed out that
this is the smallest transitive model of ZFC containing all ordinals and closed
under countable sequences. Kunen [17] showed that C(Lω1ω1) fails to satisfy the
Axiom of Choice, if we assume the existence of uncountably many measurable
cardinals (see Theorem 5.10 below). Sureson [38, 39] investigated a Covering
Lemma for C(Lω1ω1).
Proposition 2.3. For any L∗ the class C(L∗) is a transitive model of ZF contain-
ing all the ordinals.
Proof. As in the usual proof of ZF in L. Let us prove the Comprehension Schema
as an example. Suppose A,~b are in C(L∗), ϕ(x, ~y) is a first order formula of set
theory and
X = {a ∈ A : C(L∗) |= ϕ(a,~b)}.
Let α be an ordinal such that A ∈ L′α and ϕ(x, y) is absolute for L
′
α, C(L
∗) (see
e.g. [19, IV.7.5]). Now
X = {a ∈ L′α : L
′
α |= a ∈ A ∧ ϕ(a,~b)}.
Hence X ∈ C(L∗).
We cannot continue and follow the usual proof of AC in L, because the syntax
of L∗ may introduce sets into C(L∗) without introducing a well-ordering for them
(See Theorem 2.11). Also, formulas of L∗, such as
∨
n x = yn if in Lω1ω, may
contain infinitely many free variables and that could make C(L∗) closed under ω-
sequences, rendering it vulnerable to the failure of AC. To overcome this difficulty,
we introduce the following concept, limiting ourselves to logics in which every
formula has only finitely many free variables:
Definition 2.4. A logic L∗ is adequate to truth in itself2 if for all finite vocabu-
laries K there is function ϕ 7→ pϕq from all formulas ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ L∗ in the
vocabularyK into ω, and a formula SatL∗(x, y, z) in L∗ such that:
2This is a special case of a concept with the same name in [10].
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1. The function ϕ 7→ pϕq is one to one and has a recursive range.
2. For all admissible sets3 M , formulas ϕ ofL∗ in the vocabularyK, structures
N ∈ M in the vocabulary K, and a1, . . . , an ∈ N the following conditions
are equivalent:
(a) M |= SatL∗(N , pϕq, 〈a1, . . . , an〉)
(b) N |= ϕ(a1, . . . , an).
We may admit ordinal parameters in this definition.
Most logics that one encounters in textbooks and research articles of logic are
adequate to truth in themselves. To find counter examples one has to consider e.g.
logics with infinitely many generalized quantifiers.
Example 2.5. First order logic Lωω and the logic L(Qα) are adequate to truth in
themselves. Also second order logic is adequate to truth in itself in the slightly
weaker sense that M has to be of size ≥ 2|N | because we also have second order
variables. Infinitary logics are for obvious reasons (cannot use natural numbers for
Go¨del-numbering) not adequate to truth in themselves, but there is a more general
notion which applies to them (see [10, 40]). In infinitary logic what accounts as
a formula depends on set theory. For example, in the case of Lω1ω the formulas
essentially code in their syntax all reals.
The following proposition is instrumental in showing that C(L∗), for certain
L∗, satisfies the Axiom of Choice:
Proposition 2.6. If L∗ is adequate to truth in itself, there are formulas ΦL∗(x)
andΨL∗(x, y) of L
∗ in the vocabulary {∈} such that ifM is an admissible set and
α = M ∩On, then:
1. {a ∈M : (M,∈) |= ΦL∗(a)} = L′α ∩M.
2. {(a, b) ∈ M ×M : (M,∈) |= ΨL∗(a, b)} is a well-order <
′
α the field of
which is L′α ∩M .
3I.e. transitive models of the Kripke-Platek axiomsKP of set theory. The only reason why we
need admissibility is that admissible sets are closed under inductive definitions of the simple kind
that are used in the syntax and semantics of many logics. For more on admissibility we refer to
[5].
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It is important to note that the formulas ΦL∗(x) and ΨL∗(x, y) are in the ex-
tended logic L∗, not necessarily in first order logic.
Recall that we have defined the logic L∗ as a pair (S∗, T ∗). We can use the
set-theoretical predicates S∗ and T ∗ to write “(M,∈) |= ΦL∗(a)” and “(M,∈) |=
ΨL∗(x, y)” of Proposition 2.6 as formulas Φ˜L∗(M,x) and Ψ˜L∗(M,x, y) of the first
order language of set theory, such that for allM with α = M ∩On and a, b ∈M :
1. Φ˜L∗(M, a)↔ [(M,∈) |= ΦL∗(a)]↔ a ∈ L′α.
2. Ψ˜L∗(M, a, b)↔ [(M,∈) |= ΨL∗(a, b)]↔ a <
′
α b.
Proposition 2.7. IfL∗ is adequate to truth in itself, then C(L∗) satisfies the Axiom
of Choice.
Proof. Let us fix α and show that there is a well-order of L′α in C(L
∗). Let
κ = |α|+. Then ΨL∗(x, y) defines on L′κ a well-order <
′
κ of L
′
κ. The relation <
′
κ
is in L′κ+1 ⊆ C(L
∗) by the definition of C(L∗).
There need not be a first order definable well-order of the class C(L∗) (see the
proof of Theorem 6.6 for an example) although there always is in V a definable
relation which well-orders C(L∗). Of course, in this case V 6= C(L∗). Proposi-
tion 2.7 holds also for second order logic, even though it is only adequate to truth
in itself in a slight weaker sense.
Note that trivially
L∗ ≤ L+ implies C(L∗) ⊆ C(L+).
Thus varying the logic L∗ we get a whole hierarchy of inner models C(L∗). Many
questions can be asked about these inner models. For example we can ask: (1) can
all the known inner models be obtained in this way, (2) under which conditions
do these inner models satisfy GCH, (3) do inner models obtained in this way have
other characterisations (such as L, HOD and C(Lω1ω1) have), etc.
Definition 2.8. A set a is ordinal definable if there is a formula ϕ(x, y1, . . . , yn)
and ordinals α1, . . . , αn such that
∀x(x ∈ a ⇐⇒ ϕ(x, α1, . . . , αn)). (2)
A set a is hereditarily ordinal definable if a itself and also every element of TC(a)
is ordinal definable.
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When we look at the construction of C(L∗) we can observe that sets in C(L∗)
are always hereditarily ordinal definable when the formulas of L∗ are finite (more
generally, the formulas may be hereditarily ordinal definable):
Proposition 2.9. If L∗ is any logic such that the formulas S∗ and T ∗ do not con-
tain parameters (except hereditarily ordinal definable ones) and in addition every
formula of L∗ (i.e. element of the class S∗) is a finite string of symbols (or more
generally hereditarily ordinal definable, with only finitely many free variables),
then every set in C(L∗) is hereditarily ordinal definable.
Proof. Recall the construction of the successor stage of C(L∗): X ∈ L′α+1 if and
only if for some ϕ(x, ~y) ∈ L∗ and some~b ∈ L′α
X = {x ∈ L′α : (L
′
α,∈) |= ϕ(x,~b)}.
Now we can note that
X = {x ∈ L′α : T
∗((L′α,∈), ϕ(x,~b))}.
Thus if L′α is ordinal definable, then so isX . Moreover,
∀z(z ∈ L′α+1 ⇐⇒ ∃ϕ(x, ~u)(S
∗(ϕ(x, ~u))∧
∀y(y ∈ z ⇐⇒ y ∈ L′α ∧ T
∗((L′α,∈), ϕ(x, ~u))),
or in short
∀z(z ∈ L′α+1 ⇐⇒ ψ(z, L
′
α)),
where ψ(z, w) is a first order formula in the language of set theory. When we
compare this with (2) we see that if L′α is ordinal definable and if the (first order)
set-theoretical formulas S∗ and T ∗ have no parameters, then also L′α+1 is ordinal
definable. It follows that the class 〈L′α : a ∈ On〉 is ordinal definable, whence
〈L′α : α < ν〉, and thereby also L
′
ν , is in HOD for all limit ν.
Thus, unless the formulas of the logic L∗ are syntactically complex (as hap-
pens in the case of infinitary logics like Lω1ω and Lω1ω1 , where a formula can code
an arbitrary real), the hereditarily ordinal definable sets form a firm ceiling for the
inner models C(L∗).
Theorem 2.10. C(L∞ω) = V.
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Proof. Let (L′α)α be the hierarchy behind C(L∞ω), as in Definition 2.2. We show
Vα ⊆ C(L∞ω) by induction on α. For any set a let the formulas θa(x) of set
theory be defined by the following transfinite recursion:
θa(x) =
∧
b∈a
∃y(yEx ∧ θb(y)) ∧ ∀y(yEx→
∨
b∈a
θb(y)).
Note that in any transitive setM containing a:
(M,∈) |= ∀x(θa(x) ⇐⇒ x = a).
Let us assume Vα ⊆ C(L∞ω), or more exactly, Vα ∈ L′β. Let X ⊆ Vα. Then
X = {a ∈ L′β : L
′
β |= a ∈ Vα ∧
∨
b∈X
θb(a)} ∈ L
′
β+1.
Note that the proof actually shows C(Lω∞ω) = V .
Theorem 2.11. C(Lωω1ω) = L(R).
Proof. Let (L′α)α be the hierarchy behindC(L
ω
ω1ω
). We first showL(R) ⊆ C(Lωω1ω).
Since C(Lωω1ω) is clearly a transitive model of ZF it suffices to show that R ⊆
C(Lωω1ω). Let X ⊆ ω. Let ϕn(x) be a formula of set theory which defines the
natural number n in the obvious way. Then
X = {a ∈ L′α : L
′
α |= a ∈ ω ∧
∨
n∈X
ϕn(a)} ∈ L
′
α+1.
Next we show C(Lωω1ω) ⊆ L(R). We prove by induction on α that L
′
α ⊆ L(R).
Suppose this has been proved for α and L′α ∈ Lβ(R). Suppose X ∈ L
′
α+1. This
means that there is a formula ϕ(x, ~y) of Lωω1ω and a finite sequence
~b ∈ L′α such
that
X = {a ∈ L′α : L
′
α |= ϕ(a,~b)}.
It is possible (see e.g. [5, page 83]) to write a first order formula Φ of set theory
such that
X = {a ∈ Lβ(R) : Lβ(R) |= Φ(a, L
′
α, ϕ,
~b)}.
Since there is a canonical coding of formulas of Lωω1ω by reals we can consider ϕ
as a real parameter. ThusX ∈ Lβ+1(R).
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Theorem 2.12. C(Lω1ω) = C(Lω1ω1) (= Chang model).
Proof. The model C(Lω1ω) is closed under countable sequences, for if an ∈
C(Lω1ω) for n < ω, then the Lω1ω-formula
∀y(y ∈ x↔
∨
n
y = 〈n, an〉).
defines the sequence 〈an : n < ω〉. Since the Chang model is the smallest transi-
tive model of ZF closed under countable sequences, the claim follows.
We already known that several familiar inner models (L itself, L(R), Chang
model) can be recovered in the form C(L∗). We can also recover the inner model
Lµ of one measurable cardinal as a model of the form C(L∗) in the following
somewhat artificial way:
Definition 2.13. Suppose U is a normal ultrafilter on κ. We define a generalised
quantifier QκU as follows:
M |= QUκwxyvθ(w)ϕ(x, y)ψ(v) ⇐⇒
∃π : (S,R) ∼= (κ,<) ∧ π′′A ∈ U,
where
S = {a ∈M :M |= θ(a)}
R = {(a, b) ∈M2 :M |= ϕ(a, b)}
A = {a ∈M :M |= ψ(a)}
Theorem 2.14. C(QUκ ) = L
U .
Proof. Let (L′α) be the hierarchy that defines C(Q
U
κ ). We prove for all a: L
′
α =
LUα . We use induction on α. Suppose the claim is true up to α. SupposeX ∈ L
′
α+1,
e.g.
X = {a ∈ L′α : (L
′
a,∈) |= ϕ(a,~b)},
where ϕ(x, ~y) ∈ FO(QUκ ) and ~b ∈ L
′
α. We show X ∈ L
U
α . To prove this we use
induction on ϕ(x, ~y). Suppose
X = {a ∈ L′α : (L
′
α,∈) |= Q
U
κwxyvθ(z, a,
~b)ϕ(x, y, a,~b)ψ(v, a,~b)}
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and the claim has been proved for θ, ϕ and ψ. Let
Ya = {c ∈ L
′
α : (L
′
α,∈) |= θ(c, a,~b)},
Ra = {(c, d) ∈ L
′2
α : (L
′
α,∈) |= ϕ(c, d, a,~b)},
and
Sa = {c ∈ L
′
α : (L
′
α,∈) |= ψ(c, a,~b)}.
Thus
X = {a ∈ L′α : ∃π : (Ya, Ra)
∼= (κ,<) ∧ π′′Sa ∈ U}.
But now
X = {a ∈ LUα : ∃π : (Ya, Ra)
∼= (κ,<) ∧ π′′Sa ∈ U ∩ L
U},
soX ∈ LU .
Claim 2: For all a: LUα ∈ C(Q
U
κ ). We use induction on α. It suffices to prove
for all α: U ∩ LUα ∈ C(Q
U
κ ). Suppose the claim is true up to α. We show
U ∩ LUα+1 ∈ C(Q
U
κ ). Now
U ∩ LUα+1 = U ∩ Def(L
U
α ,∈, U ∩ L
U
α )
= {X ⊆ LUα : X ∈ U ∧X ∈ Def(L
U
α ,∈, U ∩ L
U
α )}
3 Absolute logics
The concept of an absolute logic attempts to capture the first-order content of
Lωω. Is it possible that logics that are “first order” in the way Lωω is turn out to be
substitutable with Lωω in the definition of the constructible hierarchy?
Barwise writes in [3, pp. 311-312]:
“Imagine a logician k using T as his metatheory for defining the basic
notions of a particular logic L∗. When is it reasonable for us, as
outsiders looking on, to call L∗ a “first order” logic? If the words
“first order” have any intuitive content it is that the truth or falsity of
M |=∗ ϕ should depend only on ϕ and M, not on what subsets of
M may or may not exist in k ’s model of his set theory T . In other
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words, the relation |=∗ should be absolute for models of T . What
about the predicate ϕ ∈ L∗ of ϕ? To keep from ruling out Lω1ω (the
predicate ϕ ∈ Lω1ω is not absolute since the notion of countable is not
absolute) we demand only that the notion of L∗-sentence be persistent
for models of T : i.e. that if ϕ ∈ L∗ holds in k ’s model of T then it
should hold in any end extension of it.”
Using absoluteness as a guideline, Barwise [3] introduced the concept of an abso-
lute logic:
Definition 3.1. Suppose A is any class and T is any theory in the language of
set theory. A logic L∗ is T -absolute if there are a Σ1-predicate S1(x), a Σ1-
predicate T1(x, y), and a Π1-predicate T
′
1(x, y) such that ϕ ∈ L
∗ ⇐⇒ S1(ϕ),
M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ T1(M,ϕ) and T ⊢ ∀x∀y(S1(x) → (T1(x, y) ↔ T ′1(x, y))). If
parameters from a classA are allowed, we say that L∗ is absolute with parameters
from A.
Note that the stronger T is, the weaker the notion of T -absoluteness is. Bar-
wise [3] calls KP4-absolute logics strictly absolute.
As Theorems 2.10 and 2.11 demonstrate, absolute logics (such as Lωω1ω) may
be very strong from the point of view of the inner model construction. However,
this is so only because of the potentially complex syntax of the absolute logics, as
is the case with Lω1ω. Accordingly we introduce the following notion:
Definition 3.2. An absolute logic L∗ has T -absolute syntax if its sentences are
(coded as) natural numbers and there is a Π1-predicate S
′
1(x) such that T ⊢
∀x(S1(x)↔ S ′1(x)). We may allow parameters, as in Definition 3.1.
In other words, to say that a logic L∗ has “absolute syntax” means that the
class of L∗-formulas has a ∆T1 -definition. Obviously, Lω1ω does not satisfy this
condition. On the other hand, many absolute logics, such as Lωω, L(Q0), weak
second order logic, LHYP, etc have absolute syntax.
The original definition of absolute logics does not allow parameters. Still there
are many logics that are absolute apart from dependence on a parameter. In our
context it turns out that we can and should allow parameters.
The cardinality quantifier Qα is defined as follows:
M |= Qαxϕ(x,~b) ⇐⇒ |{a ∈M :M |= ϕ(a,~b)}| ≥ ℵα.
4Kripke-Platek set theory.
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A slightly stronger quantifier is
M |= QEαx, yϕ(x, y,~c) ⇐⇒ {(a, b) ∈M
2 :M |= ϕ(a, b,~c)} is an
equivalence relation with ≥ ℵα classes.
Example 3.3. 1. L∞ω is KP-absolute [3].
2. L(Qα) is ZFC-absolute with ωα as parameter.
3. L(QEα ) is ZFC-absolute with ωα as parameter.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose L∗ is ZFC+V=L-absolute with parameters from L, and
the syntax of L∗ is (ZFC+V=L)-absolute with parameters from L. Then C(L∗) =
L.
Proof. We use induction on α to prove that L′α ⊆ L. We suppose L
′
α ⊆ L and
that ZFCn is a finite part of ZFC so that L∗ is ZFCn + V = L-absolute. Then
L′α ∈ Lγ for some γ such that Lγ |= ZFCn. We show that L
′
α+1 ⊆ Lγ+1. Suppose
X ∈ L′α+1. Then X is of the form
X = {a ∈ L′α : (L
′
α,∈) |= ϕ(a,~b)},
where ϕ(x, ~y) ∈ L∗ and ~b ∈ L′α. W.l.o.g., ϕ(x, ~y) ∈ Lγ . By the definition of
absoluteness,
X = {a ∈ Lγ : (Lγ ,∈) |= a ∈ L
′
α ∧ S1(ϕ(x, ~y)) ∧ T1(L
′
α, ϕ(a,
~b))}.
Hence X ∈ Lγ+1. This also shows that 〈L′α : α < ν〉 ∈ L, and thereby L
′
ν ∈ L,
for limit ordinals ν.
A consequence of the Theorem 3.4 is the following:
Conclusion: The constructible hierarchy L is unaffected if first order logic is
exchanged in the construction of L for any of the following, simultaneously or
separately:
• Recursive infinite conjunctions
∧∞
n=0 ϕn and disjunctions
∨∞
n=0 ϕn.
• Cardinality quantifiers Qα, α ∈ On.
• Equivalence quantifiers QEα , α ∈ On.
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• Well-ordering quantifier5
M |= Wx, yϕ(x, y) ⇐⇒
{(a, b) ∈M2 :M |= ϕ(a, b)} is a well-ordering.
• Recursive game quantifiers
∀x0∃y0∀x1∃y1 . . .
∞∧
n=0
ϕn(x0, y0, . . . , xn, yn),
∀x0∃y0∀x1∃y1 . . .
∞∨
n=0
ϕn(x0, y0, . . . , xn, yn).
• Magidor-Malitz quantifiers6 at ℵ0
M |= QMM,n0 x1, . . . , xnϕ(x1, . . . , xn) ⇐⇒
∃X ⊆M(|X| ≥ ℵ0 ∧ ∀a1, . . . , an ∈ X :M |= ϕ(a1, . . . , an)).
Thus Go¨del’s L = C(Lωω) exhibits some robustness with respect to the choice of
the logic.
4 The Magidor-Malitz quantifier
The Magidor-Malitz quantifier at ℵ1 [23] extends Q1 by allowing us to say that
there is an uncountable set such that, not only every element of the set satisfies
a given formula ϕ(x), but even any pair of elements from the set satisfy a given
formula ψ(x, y). Much more is expressible with the Magidor-Malitz quantifier
than with Q1, e.g. the existence of a long branch or of a long antichain in a tree,
but this quantifier is still axiomatizable if one assumes ♦. On the other hand, the
price we pay for the increased expressive power is that it is consistent, relative to
the consistency of ZF, that Magidor-Malitz logic is very badly incompact [1]. We
5This quantifier is absolute because the well-foundedness of a linear order < is equivalent to
the existence of a function from the tree of strictly <-decreasing sequences into the ordinals such
that a strictly longer sequence is always mapped to a strictly smaller ordinal.
6This quantifier is absolute because the existence of an infinite set X as above is equivalent
to the non-well-foundedness of the tree of strictly ⊂-increasing sequences (s0, . . . , sm) of finite
subsets of the model with the property thatM |= ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds for all a1, . . . , an ∈ sm.
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show that while it is consistent, relative to the consistency of ZF, that the Magidor-
Malitz logic generates an inner model different from L, if we assume 0♯, the inner
model collapses to L. This is a bit surprising, because the existence of 0♯ implies
that L is very “slim”, in the sense that it is not something that an a priori bigger
inner model would collapse to. The key to this riddle is that under 0♯ the Magidor-
Malitz logic itself loses its “sharpness” and becomes in a sense absolute between
V and L.
Definition 4.1. The Magidor-Malitz quantifier in dimension n is the following:
M |= QMM,nα x1, . . . , xnϕ(x1, . . . , xn) ⇐⇒
∃X ⊆M(|X| ≥ ℵα ∧ ∀a1, . . . , an ∈ X :M |= ϕ(a1, . . . , an)).
The original Magidor-Malitz quantifier had dimension 2 and α = 1:
M |= QMM1 x1, x2ϕ(x1, x2) ⇐⇒
∃X ⊆M(|X| ≥ ℵ1 ∧ ∀a1, a2 ∈ X :M |= ϕ(a1, a2)).
The logicsL(QMM,<ωκ ) and L(Q
MM,n
κ ) are adequate to truth in themselves (recall
Definition 2.4), with κ as a parameter.
Note that putting n = 1 gives us Q1:
M |= Q1xϕ(x) ⇐⇒
∃X ⊆M(|X| ≥ ℵ1 ∧ ∀a ∈ X :M |= ϕ(a)).
We have already noted in Footnote 6 that for α = 0 this quantifier is absolute.
Theorem 4.2. If 0♯ exists, then C(QMM,<ωα ) = L.
Proof. We treat only the case n = 2, α = 1. The general case is treated similarly,
using induction on n. The proof hinges on the following lemma:
Lemma 4.3. Suppose 0♯ exists and A ∈ L, A ⊆ [η]2. If there is an uncountable
B such that [B]2 ⊆ A, then there is such a set B in L.
Proof. Let us first see how the Lemma helps us to prove the theorem. We will use
induction on α to prove that L′α ⊆ L. We supposeL
′
α ⊆ L, and hence L
′
α ∈ Lγ for
some canonical indiscernible γ. We show that L′α+1 ⊆ Lγ+1. SupposeX ∈ L
′
α+1.
ThenX is of the form
X = {a ∈ L′α : (L
′
α,∈) |= ϕ(a,~b)},
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where ϕ(x, ~y) ∈ L(QMM1 ) and ~b ∈ L
′
α. For simplicity we suppress the mention of
~b. Since we can use induction on ϕ, the only interesting case is
X = {a ∈ L′α : ∃Y (|Y | ≥ ℵ1 ∧ ∀x, y ∈ Y : (L
′
α,∈) |= ψ(x, y, a))},
where we already have for each a ∈ L′α
A = {{c, d} ∈ [L′α]
2 : (L′α,∈) |= ψ(c, d, a)} ∈ L.
Now the Lemma implies
X = {a ∈ L′α : ∃Y ∈ L(|Y | ≥ ℵ1 ∧ ∀x, y ∈ Y : (L
′
α,∈) |= ψ(x, y, a))}.
Since Lγ ≺ L, we have
X = {a ∈ L′α : ∃Y ∈ Lγ(|Y | ≥ ℵ1 ∧ ∀x, y ∈ Y : (L
′
α,∈) |= ψ(x, y, a))}.
Finally,
X = {a ∈ Lγ : (Lγ,∈) |= a ∈ L
′
α∧
∃z(“∃f : (ℵ1)
V 1−1→ z” ∧ ∀x, y ∈ zψ(x, y, a)(L
′
α,∈))}.
Now we prove the Lemma. W.l.o.g. the setB of the lemma satisfies |B| = ℵ1,
say B = {δi : i < ω1} in increasing order. Let I be the canonical closed un-
bounded class of indiscernibles forL. Let δi = τi(α
i
0, . . . , α
i
ki
), where αi0, . . . , α
i
k ∈
I . W.l.o.g., τi is a fixed term τ . Thus also ki is a fixed number k. By the∆-lemma,
by thinning I if necessary, we may assume that the finite sets {αi0, . . . , α
i
k}, i <
ω1, form a ∆-system with a root {α0, . . . , αn} and leaves {βi0, . . . , β
i
k}, i < ω1.
W.l.o.g. the mapping i 7→ βi0 is strictly increasing in i. Let γ0 = sup{β
i
0 : i < ω1}.
W.l.o.g., the mapping i 7→ βi1 is also strictly increasing in i. Let γ
′
1 = sup{β
i
1 :
i < ω1}. It may happen that γ1 = γ0. Then we continue to βi2, β
i
3, etc until we get
γ′k0 = sup{β
i
k0
: i < ω1} > γ0. Then we let γ1 = γ′k0 . We continue in this way
until we have γ0 < ... < γks−1, all limit points of I .
Recall that whenever γ is a limit point of the set I there is a naturalL-ultrafilter
Uγ ⊆ L on γ, namely A ∈ Uγ ⇐⇒ ∃δ < γ((I \ δ) ∩ γ ⊆ A). Recall also the
following property of the L-ultrafilters Uγ:
• Rowbottom Property: Suppose γ1 < ... < γn are limits of indiscernibles
and Uγ1 ,. . . ,Uγn are the corresponding L-ultrafilters. Suppose C ⊆ [γ1]
n1 ×
...× [γl]nl , where C ∈ L. Then there are B1 ∈ Uγ1 , . . . , Bl ∈ Uγl such that
[B1]
n1 × ...× [Bl]
nl ⊆ C or [B1]
n1 × ...× [Bl]
nl ∩ C = ∅. (3)
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We apply this to the ordinals γ1, . . . , γks−1 and to a set C of sequences
(ζ00 , . . . , ζ
0
k0−1
, η0ks−1 , . . . , η
0
k0−1
, . . . , ζsks−1, . . . , ζ
s
ks−1, η
s
ks−1
, . . . , ηsks−1) (4)
such that
{τ(α0, . . . , αn, ζ00 , . . . , ζ
0
k0−1
, . . . , ζsks−1, . . . , ζ
s
ks−1
),
τ(α0, . . . , αn, η
0
0, . . . , η
0
k0−1
, . . . , ηsks−1, . . . , η
s
ks−1
)} ∈ A
(5)
Since A ∈ L, also C ∈ L. Note that
C ⊆ [γ1]
2k0 × ...× [γs]
2ks
By the Rowbottom Property there are B0 ∈ Uγ0 , . . . , Bs ∈ Uγs such that
[B1]
2k0 × ...× [Bs]
2ks ⊆ C or [B1]
2k0 × ...× [Bs]
2ks ∩ C = ∅. (6)
Claim: [B1]
2k0 × ...× [Bs]2ks ⊆ C.
To prove the claim suppose [B1]
2k0 × ... × [Bs]2ks ∩ C = ∅. Since Bj ∈ Uγj ,
there is ξj < γj such that (I \ ξj) ∩ γj ⊆ Bj . We can now find i1, i2 < ω1 such
that in the sequence
βil0 , . . . , β
il
k0−1
, . . . , βilks−1 , . . . , β
il
ks−1
, l ∈ {1, 2},
where
βil0 , . . . , β
il
k0−1
< γ0 and β
il
kj−1
, . . . , βilkj−1 < γj for all j,
we actually have
ξ0 < β
il
0 , . . . , β
il
k0−1
< γ0 and for all j: ξj < β
il
kj−1
, . . . , βikj−1 < γj, l ∈ {1, 2}.
Then since
τ(α0, . . . , αn, β
il
0 , . . . , β
il
k0−1
, . . . , βilks−1, . . . , β
il
ks−1
) ∈ B,
and [B]2 ⊆ A, we have
{τ(α0, . . . , αn, β
i1
0 , . . . , β
i1
k0−1
, . . . , βi1ks−1, . . . , β
i1
ks−1
),
τ(α0, . . . , αn, β
i2
0 , . . . , β
i2
k0−1
, . . . , βi2ks−1 , . . . , β
i2
ks−1
)} ∈ A
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Hence
(βl10 , . . . , β
l1
k0−1
, βl20 , . . . , β
l2
k0−1
, . . . , βl1ks−1, . . . , β
l1
ks−1
, βl2ks−1 , . . . , β
l2
ks−1
) ∈ C (7)
contrary to the assumption [B1]
2k0 × ... × [Bs]2ks ∩ C = ∅. We have proved the
claim.
Now we define
B∗ = {τ(α0, . . . , αn, ζ00 , . . . , ζ
0
k0−1
, . . . , ζsks−1, . . . , ζ
s
ks−1
) :
(ζ00 , . . . , ζ
0
k0−1
) ∈ Bk00 , . . . , (ζ
s
ks−1
, . . . , ζsks−1) ∈ B
ks
s }.
(8)
Then B∗ ∈ L, |B∗| = ℵ1 and [B∗]2 ⊆ A.
What if we do not assume 0♯? We show that if we start from L and use forcing
we can obtain a model in which C(QMM,2ω1 ) 6= L.
Theorem 4.4. If Con(ZF), then Con(ZFC+C(QMM,2ω1 ) 6= L).
Proof. Assume V = L. Jensen and Johnsbra˚ten [13] define a sequence Tn of
Souslin trees in L and a CCC forcing notion P which forces the set a of n such
that Tˇn is Souslin to be non-constructible. But a ∈ C(QMM,2ω1 ) since the trees Tn are
in C(QMM,2ω1 ) and Sousliness of a tree can be expressed in L(Q
MM,2
ω1
) by [23, page
223]. So we are done.
This result can be strengthened in a number of ways. In [1] an ω1-sequence
of Souslin trees is constructed from ♦ giving rise to forcing extensions in which
L(QMM,2ω1 ) can express some ostensibly second order properties, and C(Q
MM,2
ω1
) is
very different from L.
There are several stronger versions of QMM,<ωκ , for example
QMRκ x1, x2, x3ψ(x1, x2, x3) ⇐⇒
∃X (∀X1, X2 ∈ X )(∀x1, x2 ∈ X1)(∀x3 ∈ X2)ψ(x1, x2, x3, ~y),
where X1, X2 range over sets of size κ and X ranges over families of size κ of
sets of size κ ([24]). The above is actually just one of the various forms of similar
quantifiers thatL(QMRκ ) has. The logicL(Q
MR
ℵ1
) is still countably compact assuming
♦. We do not know whether 0♯ implies C(QMRκ ) = L.
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5 The Cofinality Quantifier
The cofinality quantifier of Shelah [34] says that a given linear order has cofi-
nality κ. Its main importance lies in the fact that it satisfies the compactness
theorem irrespective of the cardinality of the vocabulary. Such logics are called
fully compact. This logic has also a natural complete axiomatization, provably in
ZFC. This makes the cofinality quantifier particularly appealing in this project,
even though we do not have a clear picture yet of the connection between model
theoretic properties of logics L∗and set theoretic properties of C(L∗).
The cofinality quantifier Qcfκ for a regular κ is defined as follows:
M |= Qcfκ xyϕ(x, y,~a) ⇐⇒ {(c, d) :M |= ϕ(c, d,~a)}
is a linear order of cofinality κ.
We will denote by C∗κ the inner model C(Q
cf
κ ). Note that C
∗
κ need not compute
cofinality κ correctly, it just knows which ordinals have cofinality κ in V . The
model knows this as if the model had an oracle for exactly this but nothing else.
Thus while many more ordinals may have cofinality κ in V than in C∗κ, still the
property of an ordinal having cofinality κ in V is recognised in C∗κ in the sense
that for all β and A,R ∈ C∗κ:
• {α < β : cfV (α) = κ} ∈ C∗κ
• {α < β : cfV (α) 6= κ} ∈ C∗κ
• {α < β : cfV (α) = κ ⇐⇒ cfC
∗
κ(α) = κ} ∈ C∗κ
• {a ∈ A : {(b, c) : (a, b, c) ∈ R} is a linear order on A with cofinality (in V )
equal to κ} ∈ C∗κ.
Let Onκ be the class of ordinals of cofinality κ. Let L(Onκ) be L defined in
the expanded language {∈,Onκ}. Now L(Onκ) ⊆ C∗κ because we can use the
equivalence of Onκ(β) with Q
cf
κ xy(x ∈ y ∧ y ∈ β). Conversely, C
∗
κ ⊆ L(Onκ)
because if E is a club of β such that for every linear order R ∈ Lβ(Onκ) there is
an ordinal γ < β and a function f ∈ Lβ(Onκ) mapping γ cofinally into R, then
L′α ⊆ Lβ(Onκ) whenever α ≤ β ∈ E. We have proved
C∗κ = L(Onκ).
We use C∗ to denote C∗ω.
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The following related quantifier turns out to be useful, too:
M |= Qcf<κxyϕ(x, y,~a) ⇐⇒ {(c, d) :M |= ϕ(c, d,~a)}
is a linear order of cofinality < κ.
We use C∗κ,λ to denote C(Q
cf
κ , Q
cf
λ ) and C
∗
<κ to denoteC(Q
cf
<κ). Respectively,C
∗
≤κ
denotes C(Qcf≤κ).
Our results show that the inner modelsC∗<κ all resembleC
∗ in many ways (see
e.g. Theorem 5.18), and accordingly we indeed focus mostly on C∗.
The logics C∗κ,λ and C
∗
<κ are adequate to truth in themselves (recall Defini-
tion 2.4), with κ, λ as parameters, whence these inner models satisfy AC.
We can translate the formulas ΦL(Qcfκ )(x) and ΨL(Qcfκ )(x, y), introduced in
Proposition 2.6, into ΦˆL(Qcfκ )(x, κ) and ΨˆL(Qcfκ )(x, y, κ) in the first order language
of set theory by systematically replacing
Qcfκ xyϕ(x, y,~a)
by the canonical set-theoretic formula saying the same thing. Then for allM with
α = M ∩On and a, b ∈M :
1. ΦˆL(Qcfκ )(a, κ)↔ [(M,∈) |= ΦL(Qcfκ )(a)]↔ a ∈ C
∗
κ.
2. ΨˆL(Qcfκ )(a, b, κ)↔ [(M,∈) |= ΨL(Qcfκ )(a, b)]↔ a <
′
α b.
Lemma 5.1. IfM1 andM2 are two transitive models of ZFC such that for all α:
M1 |= cf(α) = κ ⇐⇒ M2 |= cf(α) = κ,
then
(C∗κ)
M1 = (C∗κ)
M2 .
Proof. Let (L′α) be the hierarchy defining (C
∗
κ)
M1 and (L′′α) be the hierarchy defin-
ing (C∗κ)
M2 . By induction, L′α = L
′′
α for all α.
By lettingM2 = V in Proposition 5.1 we get
Corollary. SupposeM is a transitive model of ZFC such that for all α:
cf(α) = κ ⇐⇒ M |= cf(α) = κ,
then
(C∗κ)
M = C∗κ.
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This is a useful criterion. Note that (C∗κ)
M 6= C∗κ is a perfectly possible sit-
uation: In Theorem 6.3 below we construct a model M in which CH is false in
C∗. So (C∗)M 6= L. Thus in M it is true that (C∗)L 6= C∗. (C∗κ)
M 6= C∗κ also if
κ = ω, V = Lµ and M = C∗ (see the below Theorem 5.16). In this respect C∗κ
resembles HOD. There are other respects in which C∗κ resembles L.
Lemma 5.2. Suppose (L′α) is the hierarchy forming C
∗
κ. Then for α < κ we have
L′α = Lα.
We can relativize C∗ to a set X of ordinals as follows. Let us define a new
generalized quantifier as follows:
M |= QXxyϕ(x, y,~a) ⇐⇒ {(c, d) :M |= ϕ(c, d,~a)}
is a well-order of type ∈ X .
We define C∗(X) as C(Qcfω , QX). Of course, C
∗(X) = L(Onω, X).
We will prove a stronger form of the next Proposition in the next Theorem, but
we include this here for completeness:
Proposition 5.3. If 0♯ exists, then 0♯ ∈ C(Qcfκ ).
Proof. Let I be the canonical set of indiscernibles obtained from 0♯. Let us first
prove that ordinals ξ which are regular cardinals in L and have cofinality > ω in
V are in I . Suppose ξ /∈ I . Note that ξ > min(I). Let δ be the largest element of
I ∩ ξ. Let λ1 < λ2 < ... be an infinite sequence of elements of I above ξ. Let
τn(x1, . . . , xkn), n < ω,
be a list of all the Skolem terms of the language of set theory relative to the theory
ZFC+ V = L. If α < ξ, then
α = τnα(γ1, . . . , γmn, λ1, . . . , λln)
for some γ1, . . . , γmn ∈ I ∩ δ and some ln < ω. Let us fix n for a moment and
consider the set
An = {τnα(β1, . . . , βmn , λ1, . . . , λln) : β1, . . . , βn < δ}.
Note that An ∈ L and |An|L ≤ |δ|L < ξ, because ξ is a cardinal in L. Let
ηn = sup(An). Since ξ is regular in L, ηn < ξ. Since ξ has cofinality > ω in
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V , η = supn ηn < ξ. But we have now proved that every α < ξ is below η, a
contradiction. So we may conclude that necessarily ξ ∈ I .
Suppose now κ = ω. Let
X = {ξ ∈ L′ℵω : (L
′
ℵω ,∈) |= “ξ is regular in L” ∧ ¬Q
cf
κ xy(x ∈ y ∧ y ∈ ξ)}
NowX is an infinite subset of I and X ∈ C(Qcfκ ). Hence 0
♯ ∈ C(Qcfκ ):
0♯ = {pϕ(x1, . . . , xn)q : (Lℵω ,∈) |= ϕ(γ1, . . . , γn) for some γ1 < ... < γn inX}.
If κ = ℵα > ω, then we use
X = {ξ ∈ L′ℵα+ω : (L
′
ℵα+ω ,∈) |= “ξ is regular in L” ∧Q
cf
κ xy(x ∈ y ∧ y ∈ ξ)}
and argue as above that 0♯ ∈ C(Qcfκ ).
More generally, the above argument shows that x♯ ∈ C∗(x) for any x such that
x♯ exists. Hence C∗ 6= L(x) whenever x is a set of ordinals such that x♯ exists in
V (see Theorem 5.4).
Theorem 5.4. Exactly one of the following always holds:
1. C∗ is closed under sharps, (equivalently, x♯ exists for all x ⊂ On such that
x ∈ C∗).
2. C∗ is not closed under sharps and moreover C∗ = L(x) for some set x ⊂
On. (Equivalently, there is x ⊂ On such that x ∈ C∗ but x♯ does not exist.)
Proof. Suppose (1) does not hold. Suppose a ⊆ λ, λ > ω1, such that a ∈ C∗ but
a♯ does not exist. Let S = {α < λ+ : cfV (α) = ω}. We show that C∗ = L(a, S).
Trivially, C∗ ⊇ L(a, S). For C∗ ⊆ L(a, S) it is enough to show that one can
detect in L(a, S) whether a given δ ∈ On has cofinality ω (in V ) or not. If
cf(δ) = ω, and c ⊆ δ is a cofinal ω-sequence in δ, then the Covering Theorem for
L(a) gives a set b ∈ L(a) such that c ⊆ b ⊂ λ, sup(c) = sup(b) and |b| = λ. The
order type of b is in S. Hence whether δ has cofinality ω or not can be detected in
L(a, S).
Corollary. If x♯ does not exist for some x ∈ C∗, then there is λ such that C∗ |=
2κ = κ+ for all κ ≥ λ.
Theorem 5.5. The Dodd-Jensen Core model is contained in C∗.
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Proof. Let K be the Dodd-Jensen Core model of C∗. We show thatK is the core
model of V . Assume otherwise and let M0 be the minimal Dodd-Jensen mouse
missing from K. (Minimality here means in the canonical pre-well ordering of
mice.) Let κ0 be the cardinal of M0 on which M0 has the M0-normal measure.
Denote this normal measure by U0. Note that M0 = J
U0
α for some α. Jα[U0] is
the Jensen J-hierarchy of constructibility from U0, where Jα[U0] =
⋃
β<ωα S
U0
β ,
where SU0β is the finer S-hierarchy.
Let ξ0 be (κ
+
0 )
M0 . (If (κ+0 )
M0 does not exist in M0 put ξ0 = M ∩ ON .). Let
δ = cfV (ξ0).
For an ordinal β let Mβ be the β’th iterated ultrapower of M0 where for β ≤
γ let jβ,γ : Mβ → Mγ be the canonical ultrapower embedding. jβ,γ is a Σ0-
embedding. Let κβ = j0β(κ0), Uβ = j0β(U0), ξβ = j0β(ξ0). (In case (κ
+
0 )
M0 does
not exist we put ξβ = Mβ ∩ ON .). κβ is the critical point of jβγ for β < γ. For a
limit β and A ∈Mβ , A ⊆ κβ A ∈ Uβ iff κγ ∈ A for large enough γ < β.
Claim. 1. For every β we have ξβ = sup j”0β(ξ0). Hence cf
V (ξβ) = δ.
Proof. Every η < ξβ is of the form j0β(f)(κγ0 . . . , κγn−1) for some γ0 < γ1 . . . <
γn−1 < β and for some f ∈ M0, f : κ
n
0 → ξ0. By definition of ξ0 there is ρ < ξ0
such that f(α0, . . . αn−1) < ρ for every 〈α0, . . . αn−1〉 ∈ κn0 . Hence it follows
that every value of j0β(f) is bounded by j0β(ρ). So η < j0β(ρ), which proves the
claim.
The usual proof of GCH in L[U ] shows that κ
κβ
β ∩Mβ ⊆ J
Uβ
ξβ
and that J
Uβ
ξβ
is
the increasing union of δ members ofMβ , each one having cardinality κβ inMβ.
Claim. 2. Let κ0 < η < κβ be such that Mβ |= η is regular, then either there is
γ < β such that η = κγ or cf
V (η) = δ.
Proof. By induction on β. The claim is vacuously true for β = 0. For β limit
κβ = sup{κγ|γ < β}. Hence there is α < β such that η < κα. jαβ(η) =
η) so Mα |= η is regular. So the claim in this case follows from the induction
assumption.
We are left with the case that β = α+1. If η ≤ κα the claim follows from the
inductive assumption for α as in the limit case. So we are left with the case κα <
η < κβ. Mβ is the ultrapower ofMα by Uα, so η is represented in this ultrapower
by a function f ∈Mα whose domain is κα. By the assumption η < κβ = jαβ(κα)
we can assume f(ρ) < κα for every ρ < κα. By the assumption κα < η we can
assume that ρ < f(ρ) for every ρ < κα and by the assumption that η is regular
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in Mβ we can assume that f(ρ) is regular in Mα for every ρ < κα. In order to
simplify notation putM = Mα, κ = κα, U = Uα, and ξ = ξα.
In order to show that cfV (η) = δ we shall define (in V ) a sequence 〈gν |ν < δ〉
of functions in κκ ∩M such that :
1. The sequence is increasing modulo U .
2. For every ρ < κ, gν(ρ) < f(ρ).
3. The ordinals represented by these functions in the ultrapower of M by U
are cofinal in η.
By the definition of ξ and the previous claim we can represent κκ ∩M as an
increasing union
⋃
ψ<δ Fψ where for every ψ < δ, Fψ ∈M and Fψ has cardinality
κ inM . For ψ < δ fix an enumeration inM of 〈hψρ |ρ < κ〉 of the set Gψ = {h ∈
Fψ|∀ρ < κ(h(ρ) < f(ρ))}. Let fψ ∈ κκ be defined by fψ(ρ) = sup({hψµ(ρ)|µ <
ρ}). Clearly fψ ∈ M and fψ bounds all the functions in Gψ modulo U . Also
since for all ρ < κ and h ∈ Gψ h(ρ) < f(ρ) we obtain fψ(ρ) < f(ρ). (Recall
that f(ρ) > ρ, f(ρ) is regular in M and fψ(ρ) is the sup of a set in M whose
cardinality inM is ρ. ).
Define gν by induction on ν < δ. By induction we shall also define an increas-
ing sequence 〈ψν |ν < δ〉 such that ψν < δ and gν ∈ Gψν . Given 〈ψµ|µ < ν〉 let
σ be their sup. Let gν be fσ and let ψν be the minimal member of δ − σ such that
fσ ∈ Gψν . The induction assumptions on gµ, ψµ for µ < ν and the properties of
fσ yields that gν and ψν also satisfy the required inductive assumption.
The fact that the sequence of ordinals represented by 〈gν |ν < δ〉 in the ultra-
power of M by U is cofinal in η follows from the fact that every ordinal below
η is represented by some function h which is bounded everywhere by f , hence it
belongs to Gψ for some ψ < δ. There is ν such that ψ < ψν and then gν+1 will
bound h modulo U .
The minimality of M0 (hence the minimality of the equivalent Mβ) implies
that for every β, P(κβ) ∩K = P(κβ) ∩Mβ. It follows that ρ ≤ κβ is regular in
K iff it is regular in Mβ. In particular for every β, κβ is regular in K since it is
regular inMβ.
Claim. 3. Let λ be a regular cardinal greater than max(|M0|, δ). Then there there
isD ∈ C∗, D ⊆ E = {κβ|β < λ} which is cofinal in λ.
Proof. Note that λ > |M0| implies that the set E = {κβ|β < λ} is a club in λ.
Let Sλ0 be the set of ordinals in λ whose cofinality (in V ) is ω. Obviously both
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E−Sλ0 and E ∩S
λ
0 are unbounded in λ. Let C be the set of the ordinals of λ−κ0
which are regular in K. By the definition of C∗ and K both Sλ0 and C are in C
∗.
Also E ⊆ C since κβ is regular inMβ, hence regular inK.
If δ 6= ω then we can take D = C ∩ Sλ0 which by Claim 2 is a subset of E
which is unbounded in λ. If δ = ω then similarly we can take D = C − Sλ0 . In
both cases D ∈ C∗.
Pick λ,E as in the Claim above and let D ⊆ λ be the witness to the claim. It
is well known that for every X ∈ Mλ X ∈ Uλ iff X ⊆ λ and X contains a final
segment of E. Since Uλ is an ultrafilter on λ inMλ we get that for X ∈Mλ, X ⊆
λ X ∈ Uβ iffX contains a final segment ofD. Let FD be the filter on λ generated
by final segments of D. D ∈ C∗ implies that L(FD) ⊆ C∗. Mλ = JUλα for some
ordinal α. But since Uλ = FD ∩Mλ we get that Mλ = JFDα . Now this implies
that Mλ ∈ C∗. This is because C∗ contains an iterate of the mouse M0 and then
by standard Dodd-Jensen Core model techniques M0 ∈ C
∗, which is clearly a
contradiction.
Theorem 5.6. Suppose an inner model with a measurable cardinal exists. Then
C∗ contains some inner model Lν for a measurable cardinal.
Proof. This is as the proof of Theorem 5.5. Suppose Lµ exists, but does not exist
in C∗. Let κ0 be the cardinal of M0 = L
µ on which Lµ has the normal measure.
Denote this normal measure by U0. Let ξ0 be (κ
+
0 )
M0 and let δ = cfV (ξ0).
For an ordinal β letMβ be the β’th iterated ultrapower ofM0 and for β ≤ γ let
jβ,γ : Mβ →Mγ be the canonical ultrapower embedding. jβγ is a Σ0-embedding.
Let κβ = j0β(κ0), Uβ = j0β(U0), ξβ = j0β(ξ0). κβ is the critical point of jβγ for
β < γ. For a limit β and A ∈ Mβ, A ⊆ κβ, A ∈ Uβ iff κγ ∈ A for large enough
γ < β.
Claim. 1. For every β, ξβ = sup j0β”(ξ0). Hence cf
V (ξβ) = δ.
Proof. Every η < ξβ is of the form j0β(f)(κγ0 . . . , κγn−1) for some γ0 < γ1 . . . <
γn−1 < β and for some f ∈ M0, f : κ
n
0 → ξ0. By definition of ξ0 there is ρ < ξ0
such that f(α0, . . . αn−1) < ρ for every 〈α0, . . . αn−1〉 ∈ κn0 . Hence it follows
that every value of j0β(f) is bounded by j0β(ρ). So η < j0β(ρ), which proves the
claim.
The usual proof of GCH in L[U ] shows that κ
κβ
β ∩Mβ ⊆ J
Uβ
ξβ
and that J
Uβ
ξβ
is
the increasing union of δ members ofMβ , each one having cardinality κβ inMβ.
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Claim. 2. Let κ0 < η < κβ be such that Mβ |= η is regular, then either there is
γ < β such that η = κγ or cf
V (η) = δ.
Proof. By induction on β. The claim is vacuously true for β = 0. For β limit
κβ = sup{κγ|γ < β}. Hence there is α < β such that η < κα. jαβ(η) =
η so Mα |= η is regular. So the claim in this case follows from the induction
assumption.
We are left with the case that β = α+1. If η ≤ κα the claim follows from the
inductive assumption for α as in the limit case. So we are left with the case κα <
η < κβ. Mβ is the ultrapower ofMα by Uα, so η is represented in this ultrapower
by a function f ∈Mα whose domain is κα. By the assumption η < κβ = jαβ(κα)
we can assume that f(ρ) < κα for every ρ < κα. By the assumption κα < η we
can assume that ρ < f(ρ) for every ρ < κα and by the assumption that η is regular
in Mβ we can assume that f(ρ) is regular in Mα for every ρ < κα. In order to
simplify notation putM = Mα, κ = κα, U = Uα, and ξ = ξα.
In order to show that cfV (η) = δ we shall define (in V ) a sequence 〈gν |ν < δ〉
of functions in κκ ∩M such that :
1. The sequence is increasing modulo U .
2. For every ρ < κ, gν(ρ) < f(ρ).
3. The ordinals represented by these functions in the ultrapower of M by U
are cofinal in η.
By the definition of ξ and by the previous claim we can represent κκ ∩ M
as an increasing union
⋃
ψ<δ Fψ where for every ψ < δ Fψ ∈ M and Fψ has
cardinality κ inM . For ψ < δ fix an enumeration in M of 〈hψρ |ρ < κ〉 of the set
Gψ = {h ∈ Fψ|∀ρ < κ(h(ρ) < f(ρ))}. Let fψ ∈ κκ be defined by fψ(ρ) =
sup({hψµ(ρ)|µ < ρ}). Clearly fψ ∈ M and fψ bounds all the functions in Gψ
modulo U . Also because for all ρ < κ and h ∈ Gψ h(ρ) < f(ρ) we get that
fψ(ρ) < f(ρ). (Recall that f(ρ) > ρ, f(ρ) is regular inM and fψ(ρ) is the sup of
a set inM whose cardinality inM is ρ.).
Define gν by induction on ν < δ. By induction we shall also define an increas-
ing sequence 〈ψν |ν < δ〉 such that ψν < δ and gν ∈ Gψν . Given 〈ψµ|µ < ν〉 let
σ be their sup. Let gν be fσ and let ψν be the minimal member of δ − σ such that
fσ ∈ Gψν . The induction assumptions on gµ, ψµ for µ < ν and the properties of
fσ yields that gν and ψν also satisfy the required inductive assumption.
The fact that the sequence of ordinals represented by 〈gν |ν < δ〉 in the ultra-
power of M by U is cofinal in η follows from the fact that every ordinal bellow
28
η is represented by some function h which is bounded everywhere by f , hence it
belongs to Gψ for some ψ < δ. There is ν such that ψ < ψν . Then gν+1 will
bound h modulo U .
We know already thatK ⊆ C∗. Since P(κβ)∩K = P(κβ)∩Mβ for every β,
it follows that ρ ≤ κβ is regular inK iff it is regular inMβ. In particular for every
β, κβ is regular in K since it is regular inMβ .
Claim. 3. Let λ be a regular cardinal greater than max(|M0|, δ). Then there there
isD ∈ C∗, D ⊆ E = {κβ|β < λ} which is cofinal in λ.
Proof of the Claim: Note that λ > |M0| implies that the set E = {κβ|β < λ}
is a club in λ. Let Sλ0 be the set of ordinals in λ whose cofinality (in V ) is ω.
Obviously both E − Sλ0 and E ∩ S
λ
0 are unbounded in λ. Let C be the set of the
ordinals of λ−κ0 which are regular inK. By definition of C∗ andK both Sλ0 and
C are in C∗. Also E ⊆ C since κβ is regular inMβ, hence regular inK.
If δ 6= ω then we can take D = C ∩ Sλ0 which by Claim 2 is a subset of E
which is unbounded in λ. If δ = ω then similarly we can take D = C − Sλ0 . In
both cases D ∈ C∗. The Claim is proved.
Pick λ,E as in the Claim above and let D ⊆ λ be the witness to the claim.
It is well known that for every X ∈ Mλ X ∈ Uλ iff X ⊆ λ and X contains a
final segment of E. Since Uλ is an ultrafilter on λ in Mλ we get that for X ∈
Mλ, X ⊆ λ X ∈ Uβ iffX contains a final segment ofD. Let FD be the filter on λ
generated by final segments of D. D ∈ C∗ implies that L(FD) ⊆ C∗. Mλ = JUλα
for some ordinal α. But since Uλ = FD ∩ Mλ we get that Mλ = JFDα . Thus
Mλ ∈ C∗, i.e. C∗ contains an iterate of M0. Hence C∗ contains an inner model
with a measurable cardinal.
Below (Theorem 5.16) we will show that if Lµ exists, then (C∗)L
µ
can be
obtained by adding to the ω2th iterate of Lµ the sequence {κω·n : n < ω}.
In the presence of large cardinals, even with just uncountably many measur-
able cardinals, we can separate C∗ from both L and HOD. We first observe that in
the special case that V = C∗, there cannot exist even a single measurable cardinal.
The proof is similar to Scott’s proof that measurable cardinals violate V = L:
Theorem 5.7. If there is a measurable cardinal κ, then V 6= C∗λ for all λ < κ.
Proof. Suppose V = C∗λ but κ > λ is a measurable cardinal. Let i : V →M with
critical point κ andMκ ⊆ M . Now (C∗λ)
M = (C∗λ)
V = V , whenceM = V . This
contradicts Kunen’s result [16] that there cannot be a non-trivial i : V → V .
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We can strengthen this as follows, at least for λ = ω. Recall that covering
is said to hold for a inner model M if for every set X of ordinals there is a set
Y ⊇ X of ordinals such that Y ∈ M and |Y | ≤ |X| + ℵ1. We can show that if
there is a measurable cardinal, then not only V 6= C∗, but we do not even have
covering for C∗:
Theorem 5.8. If there is a measurable cardinal then covering fails for C∗.
Proof. Let i : V → M with critical point κ and Mκ ⊆ M . As above, i is an
embedding of C∗ into C∗. Let κn be i
n(κ) and κω = supn κn. Clearly i(κω) = κω
and there are no fixed points of i on the interval [κ, κω). We prove that covering
fails for C∗ by showing that the singular cardinal κω is regular in C
∗. Assume
otherwise. Then the cofinality α of κω in C
∗ is, by elementarity, a fixed point of
i. Hence α < κ. Let Z be a be a subset of κω in C
∗ witnessing the fact that the
cofinality of κω in C
∗ is α. W.l.o.g., Z is the minimal such set in the canonical
wellordering of C∗. Hence i(Z) = Z. Let δ = sup(Z ∩ κ). Since κ is regular,
δ < κ. Hence i(δ) = δ. Let δ∗ be the minimal member of Z above δ. Then δ∗ ≥ κ
and i(δ∗) = δ∗. But there are no fixed points of i on the interval [κ, κω). We have
reached a contradiction.
On the other hand we will now use known results to show that we cannot fail
covering for C∗ without an inner model for a measurable cardinal. It is curious
that covering for C∗ is in this way entangled with measurable cardinals.
Theorem 5.9. If there is no inner model with a measurable cardinal then covering
holds for C∗.
Proof. By Theorem 5.5, K ⊆ C∗. If there is no inner model with a measurable
cardinal, then K satisfies covering by [9]. Hence all the more we have covering
for C∗.
Kunen [17] proved that if there are uncountably many measurable cardinals,
then AC fails in Chang’s model C(Lω1ω1). Recall that Chang’s model contains C
∗
and C∗ does satisfy AC.
Theorem 5.10. If 〈κn : n < ω〉 is any sequence of measurable cardinals (in V )
> λ, then 〈κn : n < ω〉 /∈ C∗λ and C
∗
λ 6= HOD.
Proof. We proceed as in Kunen’s proof ([17]) that AC fails in the Chang model
if there are uncountably many measurable cardinals, except that we only use in-
finitely many measurable cardinals. Suppose κn, n < ω, are measurable > λ. Let
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µ = supn κn. Let ≺ be the first well-order of µ
ω in C∗λ in the canonical well-order
of C∗λ. Suppose 〈κn : n < ω〉 ∈ C
∗
λ. Then for some η it is the ηth element in the
well-order ≺. By [17, Lemma 2] there are only finitely many measurable cardi-
nals ξ such that η is moved by the ultrapower embedding of a normal ultrafilter
on ξ. Let n be such that the ultrapower embedding j : V → M by the normal
ultrafilter on κn does not move η. Since κn > λ, (C
∗
λ)
M = C∗λ. Since µ is a strong
limit cardinal > λ, j(µ) = µ. Since the construction of C∗λ proceeds inM exactly
as it does in V , j(≺) is also inM the first well-ordering of µω that appears in C∗λ.
Hence j(≺) =≺. Since j(η) = η, the sequence 〈κn : n < ω〉 is fixed by j. But
this contradicts the fact that j moves κn.
If the κn are the first ω measurable cardinals above λ, then the sequence 〈κn :
n < ω〉 is in HOD and hence C∗λ 6= HOD.
Definition 5.11. The weak Chang model is the model Cωω1 = C(L
ω
ω1ω1
).
We can make the following observations about the relationship between the
weak Chang model and the (full) Chang model. The weak Chang model clearly
contains C∗ and L(R), as it contains C(Lωω1ω). It is a potentially interesting inter-
mediate model between L(R) and the (full) Chang model. If there is a measurable
Woodin cardinal, then the Chang model satisfies AD, whence the weak model
cannot satisfy AC, as the even bigger (full) Chang model cannot contain a well-
ordering of all the reals.
Theorem 5.12. 1. If V = Lµ, then Cωω1 6= L(R).
2. If V is the inner model for ω1 measurable cardinals, then C
ω
ω1
6= Chang
model.
Proof. For (1), suppose V = Lµ, where µ is a normal measure on κ. Let us first
note that all the reals are in C∗, because under the assumption V = Lµ all the
reals are in the Dodd-Jensen core model, which by our Theorem 5.5 is contained
in C∗. Thus all the reals are in Cωω1 . Also under the same assumption we have
in L(R) a Σ13 well ordering of the reals of order type ω1. Hence L(R) = L(A)
for some A ⊆ ω1. Suppose now Cωω1 = L(R). Then there is an A ⊆ ω1 such
that Cωω1 = L(A). By Theorem 5.6 there is in C
∗, hence in Cωω1 , an inner model
Lν with a measurable cardinal δ. But κ is in Lµ the smallest ordinal which is
measurable in an inner model. Hence κ ≤ δ and A ⊆ δ. But by [33] there cannot
be an inner model with a measurable cardinal δ in L(A), where A ⊆ δ. Therefore
we must have Cωω1 6= L(R).
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For (2), we commence by noting that in the inner model for ω1 measurable
cardinals there is a Σ13-well-order of R [36]. By means of this well-order we can
well-order the formulas of Lωω1ω1 in the Chang model. In this way we can define
a well-order of Cωω1 in the Chang model. However, since we assume uncountably
many measurable cardinals, the Chang model does not satisfy AC [17] (see also
Theorem 5.10). Hence it must be that Cωω1 6= Chang model.
If there is a Woodin cardinal, then C∗ 6= V in the strong sense that ℵ1 is a large
cardinal in C∗. So not only are there countable sequences of measurable cardinals
which are not in C∗ but there are even reals which are not in C∗:
Theorem 5.13. If there is a Woodin cardinal, then ω1 is (strongly) Mahlo in C
∗.
Proof. To prove that ω1 is strongly inaccessible in C
∗ suppose α < ℵ1 and
f : ω1 → (2
α)C
∗
is 1-1. Let λ beWoodin,Q<λ the countable stationary tower forcing andG generic
for this forcing. In V [G] there is j : V → M such that V [G] |= Mω ⊂ M and
j(ω1) = λ. Thus
j(f) : λ→ ((2α)C
∗
)M .
Let a = j(f)(ωV1 ). If a ∈ V , then j(a) = a, whence, as a i.e. j(a) is in the range
of j(f), a = f(δ) for some δ < ω1. But then
a = j(a) = j(f)(j(δ)) = j(f)(δ),
contradicting the fact that a = j(f)(ω1). Hence a /∈ V . However,
(C∗)M = (C∗<λ)
V ,
since by general properties of this forcing, an ordinal has cofinality ω in M iff it
has cofinality < λ in V . Hence a ∈ C∗<λ ⊆ V , a contradiction.
To see that ω1 is Mahlo in C
∗, suppose D is a club on ωV1 , D ∈ C
∗. Let j and
M be as above. Then j(D) is a club on λ in (C∗)M . Since ωV1 is the critical point
of j, j(D) ∩ ωV1 = D. Since j(D) is closed, ω
V
1 ∈ j(D).
Remark. In the previous theorem we can replace the assumption of a Woodin
cardinal by MM++.
For cardinals > ω1 we have an even better result:
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Theorem 5.14. Suppose there is a Woodin cardinal λ. Then every regular cardi-
nal κ such that ω1 < κ < λ is weakly compact in C
∗.
Proof. Suppose λ is a Woodin cardinal, κ > ω1 is regular and < λ. To prove that
κ is strongly inaccessible in C∗ we use the “≤ ω-closed” stationary tower forc-
ing from [11, Section 1]. With this forcing, cofinality ω is not changed, whence
(C∗)M = C∗, so the proof of Theorem 5.13 can be repeated mutatis mutandis.
Thus we need only prove the tree property. Let the forcing, j andM be as above,
in Theorem 5.13, with j(κ) = λ. Suppose T is a κ-tree in C∗. Then j(T ) is a
λ-tree in (C∗)M = C∗. We may assume j(T ↾ κ) = T ↾ κ. Let t ∈ j(T ) be of
height κ and b = {u ∈ j(T ) : u < t} = {u ∈ T : u < t}. Now b is a κ-branch of
T in C∗.
As a further application of ω-closed stationary tower forcing we extend the
above result as follows:
Theorem 5.15. If there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals, then the regular
cardinals ≥ ℵ2 are indiscernible7 in C∗.
Proof. We use the ω-closed stationary tower forcing of [11]. Let us first prove an
auxiliary claim:
Claim 1: If λ1 < . . . < λk and λ¯1 < . . . < λ¯k are Woodin cardinals, and
β1, . . . , βl < min(λ1, λ¯1), then
C∗ |= Φ(β1, . . . , βl, λ1, . . . , λk)↔ Φ(β1, . . . , βl, λ¯1, . . . , λ¯k)
for all formulas Φ(x1, . . . , xl, y1, . . . , yk) of set theory.
To prove Claim 1, assume w.l.o.g. λ¯1 > λ1. The proof proceeds by induction
on k. The case k = 0 is clear. Let us then assume the claim for k − 1. Let G
be generic for the ≤ ω-closed stationary tower forcing of [11, Section 1] with the
generic embedding
j : V →M,Mω ⊆M, j(λ1) = λ¯1, j(λ¯i) = λ¯i for i > 1.
A special feature of the ω-closed stationary tower forcing of [11] is that it does
not introduce new ordinals of cofinality ω. Thus
C∗V = C∗V [G] = C∗M .
7The cardinals are indiscernible even if the quantifierQcf
ω
is added to the language of set theory.
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Suppose now
C∗ |= Φ(β1, . . . , βl, λ1, λ2, . . . , λk).
By the induction hypothesis, inM , applied to λ2, . . . , λk and λ¯2, . . . , λ¯k,
C∗ |= Φ(β1, . . . , βl, λ1, λ¯2, . . . , λ¯k).
Since j is an elementary embedding,
C∗ |= Φ(β1, . . . , βl, λ¯1, λ¯2, . . . , λ¯k).
Claim 1 is proved.
Claim 2: If λ1 < . . . < λk are Woodin cardinals, κ1 < . . . < κk are regular
cardinals > ℵ1, λ1 > max(κ1, . . . , κk), and β1, . . . , βl < κ1, then
C∗ |= Φ(β1, . . . , βl, κ1, . . . , κk)↔ Φ(β1, . . . , βl, λ1, . . . , λk)
for all formulas Φ(x1, . . . , xl, y1, . . . , yk) of set theory.
We use induction on k to prove the claim. The case k = 0 is clear. Let us
assume the claim for k − 1. Using ω-stationary tower forcing we can find
j : V →M,Mω ⊆ M, j(κ1) = λ1, j(λi) = λi for i > 1.
Now we use the Claim to prove the theorem. Suppose now
C∗ |= Φ(β1, . . . , βl, κ1, κ2, . . . , κk).
By the induction hypothesis applied to κ2, . . . , κk and λ2, . . . , λk,
C∗ |= Φ(β1, . . . , βl, κ1, λ2, . . . , λk).
Since j is an elementary embedding,
C∗ |= Φ(β1, . . . , βl, λ1, λ2, . . . , λk).
Claim 2 is proved.
The theorem follows now immediately from Claim 2.
Note that we cannot extend Theorem 5.15 to ℵ1, for ℵ1 has the following
property, recognizable in C∗, which no other uncountable cardinal has: it is has
uncountable cofinality but all of its (limit) elements have countable cofinality.
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Theorem 5.16. If V = Lµ, then C∗ is exactly the inner model Mω2 [E], where
Mω2 is the ω
2th iterate of V and E = {κω·n : n < ω}.
Proof. In order to prove the theorem, we have to show that inMω2 we can recog-
nize which ordinals have cofinality ω in V . The following lemma gives a general
analysis about the relation between the cofinality of the ordinal in a universe and
its cofinality in an iterated ultrapower of it.
Lemma 5.17. LetM be a transitive model of ZFC+GCH with a measurable car-
dinal κ which is iterable. (Namely the iterated ultrapowers by a normal ultrafilter
on κ are all well founded.) For β ∈ On letMβ be the β-th iterate ofM . Then for
every ordinal δ ∈ Mβ if cf
M(δ) < κ then either cfMβ(δ) = cfM(δ) or there is a
limit γ ≤ β such that cfMβ(δ) = cfM(γ).
Proof. Let jβ,γ be the canonical embedding jβγ : Mβ →Mγ and let κβ = j0β(κ).
Let ξβ = (κ
+
β )
Mβ and let η = cfM(ξ0). As in claim 1 of the proof of Theorem 5.5
we can show by induction that cfM(ξβ) = η.
Claim. cfM(κβ+1) = η.
Proof. Mβ+1 is the ultrapower ofMβ by a normal ultrafilter on κβ. Since Mβ |=
GCH , it is well known that cfMβ(jβ,β+1(κβ)) = cf
Mβ(ξβ) but since we have
cfM(ξβ) = η we get cf
M(κβ+1) = η.
Without loss of generality we can assume that δ (in the formulation of the
lemma) is regular inMβ . We distinguish several cases :
δ ≤ κ We know that in this case the iterated ultrapower does not change that
cofinality of δ. Hence cfM(δ) = cfMβ(δ).
κ < δ ≤ κβ An argument like in the proof of claim 2 of the proof of Theorem
5.5 will show that either cfM(δ) = η or there is γ ≤ β such that δ = κγ .
The first case cannot occur since we assumed that cfM(δ) < κ < η. In the
second case, if γ is successor or 0 again we get by the previous claim that
cfM(δ) ≥ κ, contradicting again the assumption. If γ is limit, the lemma is
verified.
κβ < δ For simplifying notation let j = j0β . Every ordinal in Mβ is of the form
j(F )(κγ0 . . . κγk) for some γ0 < . . . γk < β and F ∈ M an ordinal valued
function defined on κk+1. In particular for every ordinal ν in Mβ there is
a function F ∈ M , F : κ<ω → On, such that ν ∈ j(F )”j(κ)<ω. Since
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cfM(δ) < κ there is inM an ordinal µ < κ and a sequence 〈Fη|η < µ〉 such
that for η < µ Fη is a function from κ
<ω such that the union of the ranges of
〈j(Fη)∩δ|η < µ〉 is cofinal in δ . But 〈j(Fη)∩δ|η < µ〉 = j(〈Fη|η < µ〉) ∈
Mβ. But the union of the ranges is the union of µ sets each of cardinality
≤ j(κ) = κβ. InMβ δ is a regular cardinal above j(κ), hence this union is
bounded in δ. A contradiction.
Corollary. If V |= GCH , κ measurable, then an ordinal has cofinality ω in V iff
its cofinality inMω2 is either ω or of the form κγ for some limit γ ≤ ω
2.
From the point of Mω2 E is a Prikry generic sequence with respect to the
image of µ. Hence the only cardinal ofMω2 that changes its cofinality is κω2 . So
inMω2 it is still true that ordinal has cofinality ω in V iff its cofinality inMω2 [E]
is in {ω} ∪ E ∪ {sup(E)}. It follows that C∗ ⊆Mω2 [E].
For the other direction, let µ′ be the image of µ in Mω2 . By Theorem 5.5 we
know that the Dodd-Jensen Core model, KDJ is the same as the Dodd-Jensen
core model of C∗. V = Lµ. Hence by claim 2 of the proof of theorem 5.6, for
η regular in KDJ , κ < η ≤ κω2 , cf(η) = ω iff η = κγ for some γ ≤ ω
2. By
the above lemma we know that for successor γ the ordinal κγ has cofinality κ
+.
Hence E is exactly the set of ordinals η which are regular in KDJ , κ ≤ η ≤ κω2
and cf(η) = ω. This shows that E ∈ C∗.
It is well known that if we define the filter F on κω2 generated by final segment
of E thenMω2 = L
µ′ = L[F ] [15]. ThereforeMω2 is a definable class in C
∗. We
concludeMω2 ⊆ C
∗ and hence finally,Mω2 [E] ⊆ C
∗.
The situation is similar with the inner model for two measurable cardinals: To
get C∗ we first iterate the first measurable ω2 times, then the second ω2 times, and
in the end take two Prikry sequences.
We now prove the important property of C∗ that its truth is invariant under
(set) forcing. We have to assume large cardinals because conceivably C∗ could
satisfy V = L but in a (set) forcing extension C∗ would violate V = L (see
Section 6 below).
Theorem 5.18. Suppose there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals. Suppose P
is a forcing notion and G ⊆ P is generic. Then
Th((C∗)V ) = Th((C∗)V [G]).
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Moreover, the theory Th(C∗) is independent of the cofinality used8, and forcing
does not change the reals of these models.
Proof. Let G be P-generic. Let us choose a Woodin cardinal λ > |P|. Let H1
be generic for the countable stationary tower forcing Q<λ. In V [H1] there is a
generic embedding j1 : V → M1 such that V [H1] |= Mω1 ⊆ M1 and j(ω1) = λ.
Hence (C∗)V [H1] = (C∗)M1 and
j1 : (C
∗)V → (C∗)M1 = (C∗)V [H1] = (C∗<λ)
V .
The last equality uses the fact that an ordinal has cofinality ω in V [H1] iff it has
cofinality < λ in V . Now by elementarity Th((C∗)V ) = Th((C∗<λ)
V ).
Since |P| < λ, λ is still Woodin in V [G]. Let H2 be generic for the countable
stationary tower forcing Q<λ over V [G]. Let j2 : V [G] → M2 be the generic
embedding. Now V [G,H2] |= Mω2 ⊆M2 and j2(ω1) = λ. Hence
j2 : (C
∗)V [G] → (C∗)M2 = (C∗)V [G,H2] = (C∗<λ)
V [G] = (C∗<λ)
V .
and therefore by elementarity (C∗)V ≡ (C∗<λ)
V ≡ (C∗)V [G].
We know (Theorem 5.13) that under the existence of a Woodin cardinal the
set of reals of C∗ is countable (in V ). Hence when we define j1 : V → M1 there
are no new reals added to the C∗ of the corresponding models. Hence the reals
of (C∗)V are the same as the reals of (C∗)M1 . We argued that the last model is
exactly (C∗<λ)
V . The same is true in V [G]. But C∗<λ does not change when we
move from V to V [G]. So (C∗)V and (C∗)V [G] have the same reals.
The argument for the elementary equivalence of C∗ and C∗<κ for κ regular,
proceeds in a similar manner. We use stationary tower forcing which produces an
elementary embedding j with critical point κ such that j(κ) = λ, where λ is a
Woodin cardinal above κ. Then we argue that j(C∗<κ) is (C
∗
<λ)
V .
We may ask, for which λ and µ is C∗<λ = C
∗
<µ? Observations:
• It is possible that C∗ 6= C∗<ω2 . Let us use the ≤ ω-closed stationary tower
forcing of [11, Section 1] to map ω3 to λ. In this model V1 the inner model
C∗ is preserved. It is easy to see that in the extension the set A of ordinals
below λ of cofinality ω1 is not in V . If C
∗ = C∗<ω2 , then A is in C
∗
<ω2
. We
are done.
8I.e. Th(C∗) = Th(C∗
<κ
) for all regular κ.
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• It is possible that C∗ changes. Extend the previous model V1 to V2 by col-
lapsing ω1 to ω. Then (C
∗)V2 = (C∗<ω2)
V1 6= (C∗)V1 . So C∗ has changed.
• Question: Does a Woodin cardinal imply C∗<ω2 6= C
∗
ω,ω1
?
We do not know whether the CH is true or false in C∗. Forcing absoluteness
of the theory of C∗ under the hypothesis of large cardinals implies, however, that
large cardinals decide the CH in C∗ in forcing extensions. This would seem to
give strong encouragement to try to solve the problem of CH in C∗. The situation
is in sharp contrast to V itself where we know that large cardinals definitely do not
decide CH [20]. We can at the moment only prove that the size of the continuum
of C∗ is at most ωV2 . In the presence of a Woodin cardinal this tells us absolutely
nothing, as then ωV2 is (strongly)Mahlo inC
∗ (Theorem 5.13), and hence certainly
far above the continuum of C∗. So the below result is mainly interesting because
it is a provable result of ZFC, independent of whether we assume the existence of
Woodin cardinals. However, we show later that in the presence of large cardinals
there is a cone of reals x such that the relativized version of C∗, C∗(x), satisfies
CH . In the light of this it is tempting to conjecture that CH is indeed true in C∗,
assuming again the existence of sufficiently large cardinals.
Theorem 5.19. |P(ω) ∩ C∗| ≤ ℵ2.
Proof. We use the notation of Definition 2.2. Suppose a ⊆ ω and a ∈ L′ξ for some
ξ. Let µ > ξ be a sufficiently large cardinal. We build an increasing elementary
chain (Mα)α<ω1 such that
1. a ∈M0 andM0 |= a ∈ C∗.
2. |Mα| ≤ ω.
3. Mα ≺ H(µ).
4. Mγ =
⋃
α<γMα, if γ = ∪γ.
5. If β ∈Mα and cf
V (β) = ω, thenMα+1 contains an ω-sequence fromH(µ),
cofinal in β.
6. If β ∈ Mα and cf
V (β) > ω then for unboundedly many γ < ω1 there is
ρ ∈Mγ+1 with
sup(
⋃
ξ<γ
(Mξ ∩ β)) < ρ < β.
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Let M be
⋃
α<ω1
Mα, N the transitive collapse ofM , and ζ the ordinal N ∩ On.
Note that |N | ≤ ω1, whence ζ < ω2. By construction, an ordinal in N has
cofinality ω in V if and only if it has cofinality ω in N . Thus (L′ξ)
N = L′ξ for all
ξ < ζ . Since N |= a ∈ C∗, we have a ∈ L′ζ . The claim follows.
The proof of Theorem 5.19 gives the following more general result:
Theorem 5.20. Let κ be a regular cardinal and δ an ordinal. Then
|P(δ) ∩ C∗κ| ≤ (|δ| · κ
+)+.
Corollary. If δ ≥ κ+ is a cardinal in C∗κ and λ = |δ|
+, then C∗κ |= 2
δ ≤ λ.
Corollary. Suppose V = C∗. Then 2ℵα = ℵα+1 for α ≥ 1, and 2
ℵ0 = ℵ1 or
2ℵ0 = ℵ2.
Theorem 5.21. Suppose E = {α < ωV2 : cf
V (α) = ωV1 }. Then ♦ℵV2 (E) holds in
C∗.
Proof. The proof is as the standard proof of ♦ℵ2(E) in L, with a small necessary
patch. We construct a sequence s = {(Sα, Dα) : α < ℵ
V
2 } taking always for
limit α the pair (Sα, Dα) to be the least (S,D) ∈ L′ℵV
2
in the well-order (see
Proposition 2.6)
R = {(a, b) ∈ (L′ℵV
2
)2 : L′ℵV
2
|= ΨL(Qcfω )(a, b)}
such that S ⊆ α, D ⊆ α a club, and S ∩ β 6= Sβ for β ∈ D, if any exists, and
Sα = Dα = α otherwise. Note that s ∈ C∗. We show that the sequence s is a
diamond sequence in C∗. Suppose it is not and (S,D) ∈ C∗ is a counter-example,
S ⊆ ℵV2 and D ⊆ ℵ
V
2 club such that S ∩ β 6= Sβ for all β ∈ D. As in the proof of
Theorem 5.19 we can constructM ≺ H(µ) such that |M | = ℵV1 , the order-type of
M ∩ ℵV2 is in E, {s, (S,D)} ⊂ M , and if N is the transitive collapse ofM , with
ordinal δ ∈ E, then {s ↾ δ, (S ∩ δ,D ∩ δ)} ⊂ N and (L′ξ)
N = L′ξ for all ξ < δ.
Because of the wayM is constructed, the well-order R restricted to L′δ is defined
inM on L′
ℵV
2
by the same formula ΨL(Qcfκ )(x, y) as R is defined on L
′
ℵV
2
in H(µ).
Since S ∩ δ ∈ L′
ℵV
2
and S ∩ β 6= Sβ for β ∈ D ∩ δ, we may assume, w.l.o.g., that
(S,D) ∈ L′
ℵV
2
. Furthermore, we may assume, w.l.o.g., that (S,D) is the R-least
counter-example to s being a diamond sequence. Thus the pair (S ∩ δ,D ∩ δ) is
the R-least (S ′, D′) such that S ′ ⊆ δ, D′ ⊆ δ a club, and S ′ ∩ β 6= S ′β for β ∈ D
′.
It follows that (S ′, D′) = (Sδ, Dδ) and, since δ ∈ D, a contradiction.
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A problem in using condensation type arguments, such as we used in the
proofs of Theorem 5.19 and Theorem 5.21 above, is the non-absoluteness of C∗.
There is no reason to believe that (C∗)C
∗
= C∗ in general (see Theorem 6.3).
Moreover, we prove in Theorem 6.7 the consistency of C∗ failing to satisfy CH,
relative to the consistency of an inaccessible cardinal.
We now prove that CH holds in C∗(y) for a cone of y. By C∗(y) we mean
the extension of C∗ in which the real y is allowed as a parameter throughout the
construction.
Suppose N is a well-founded model of ZFC− and N thinks that λ ∈ M is a
Woodin cardinal. We say that N is iterable, if all countable iterations of forming
generic ultrapowers of N by stationary tower forcing at λ are well-founded. If
N ≺ H(θ) for large enough θ andN contains a measurable cardinal (of V ) above
the Woodin cardinal, then it is iterable for the following reason: Suppose α < ω1.
Suppose N∗ is an iteration of N at the measurable cardinal until α ≤ N∗ ∩ On.
This is well-founded because it can be embedded into a long enough iteration
of V at the measurable cardinal. It is well known that an iteration of length
α ≤ N∗ ∩ On of forming generic ultrapowers of N∗ by stationary tower forc-
ing is well founded (see e.g. [42, Lemma 4.5]). Now the iteration of forming
generic ultrapowers ofN by stationary tower forcing can be embedded to the cor-
responding iteration of N∗. Since the latter iteration is well-founded, so is the
former.
We use the notation L′α(y) for the levels of the construction of C
∗(y).
Lemma 5.22. Suppose there is Woodin cardinal and a measurable cardinal above
it. Suppose a ⊆ γ < ωV1 . Then the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) a ∈ C∗(y).
(ii) There is a countable transitive iterablemodelN ofZFC−+“there is a Woodin
cardinal” such that {a, y} ⊂ N , γ < ωN1 , and N |= “a ∈ C
∗(y)”.
Proof. (i)→(ii): Suppose first a ∈ C∗(y). Pick a large enough θ and a countable
M ≺ Hθ such that γ ∪ {γ, a, y} ⊂ M and both the Woodin cardinal and the
measurable above it are in M . Then M is iterable. Let π : M ∼= N with N
transitive. This N is as required in (ii). In particular, π(a) = a, π(y) = y and
N |= “a ∈ C∗(y)” sinceM ≺ Hθ.
(ii)→(i): Suppose N is as in (ii). Since N |= “a ∈ C∗(y)”, there is β¯ < ωN2
such that N |= a ∈ L′
β¯
(y). We form an iteration sequence {Nα : α < ωV1 } with
elementary embeddings {παβ : α < β < ω1}. Let N0 = N . Let Nγ+1 be the
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transitive collapse of a generic ultrapower of the stationary tower on the image of
λ in Nγ . Let παα+1 be the canonical embedding Nα → Nα+1. For limit α ≤ ωV1 ,
the modelNα is the transitive collapse of the direct limit of the modelsNβ , β < α,
under the mappings πβγ , β < γ < α. By the iterability condition each Nα is well-
founded, so the transitive collapse exists. Since π0γ(ω
N
1 ) is extended in each step
of this iteration of length ω1 of countable models, π0ω1(ω
N
1 ) = ω
V
1 . Moreover,
π0ω1(y) = y and π0ω1(a) = a, as a ⊆ γ and γ < ω
N
1 . Now by elementarity,
Nω1 |= “a ∈ L
′
β(y)”,
where β = π0ω1(β¯).We now show
(L′β(y))
Nω1 = (L′β(y))
V . (9)
This is proved level by level. If Nω1 |= “ cf(δ) = ω”, then of course cf(δ) = ω.
Suppose then Nω1 |= “ cf(δ) > ω”, where δ < β. Let δ¯ < β¯ such that π0ω1(δ¯) =
δ. Then δ¯ < ωN2 . Thus N |= cf(δ¯) = ω1. By elementarity, Nω1 |= cf(δ) = ω1.
But ω
Nω1
1 = ω
V
1 . Hence cf(δ) = ω
V
1 . Equation (9) is proved.
Now we can prove (i): Since a ∈ (L′β(y))
Nω1 , equation (9) implies a ∈
L′β(y) ⊂ C
∗(y).
Note that condition (ii) above is a Σ13-condition. Thus, if there is a Woodin
cardinal and a measurable above, then the set of reals of C∗ is a countable Σ13-set
with a Σ13-well-ordering.
Lemma 5.23. Suppose there is a Woodin cardinal and a measurable cardinal
above it. Then the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) C∗(y) |= CH .
(ii) There is a countable transitive iterable model M of ZFC− plus “there is a
Woodin cardinal” such that y ∈ M , M |= “C∗(y) |= CH”, and (P(ω) ∩
C∗(y))M = P(ω) ∩ C∗(y).
Proof. (i)→(ii): Since we assume the existence of a Woodin cardinal, there are
only countably many reals in C∗(y). Let γ = ω
C∗(y)
1 . Thus γ < ω
V
1 . By (i) we
may find a subset a ∈ C∗(y) of γ that codes an enumeration of P(ω) ∩ C∗(y)
in order-type γ together with a well-ordering of ω of each order-type < γ. By
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lemma 5.22 there is a countable transitive iterable model N of ZFC−+“there is
a Woodin cardinal” such that {a, y} ⊂ N , γ < ωN1 and N |= “a ∈ C
∗(y)”.
We show N |= “C∗(y) |= CH”. Suppose b ∈ N is real such that N |= “b ∈
C∗(y)”. By Lemma 5.22, b ∈ C∗(y). Hence b is coded by a. The length of the
sequence a is γ, so we only have to show that N |= “γ ≤ ωC
∗(y)
1 ”. Suppose
N |= “γ > ωC
∗(y)
1 ”. In such a case, by assumption, a codes a well-ordering R of
ω of order-type (ω
C∗(y)
1 )
N . But N |= “a ∈ C∗(y)”, whence N |= “R ∈ C∗(y)”, a
contradiction. The proof that (P(ω) ∩ C∗(y))N = P(ω) ∩ C∗(y) is similar.
Assume then (ii). Let N be as in (ii). Let γ = (ω
C∗(y)
1 )
N . Since N |=
“C∗(y) |= CH”, we can let some a ⊆ γ code (P(ω) ∩ C∗(y))N as a sequence of
order-type γ. By lemma 5.22, a ∈ C∗(y). Since (P(ω)∩C∗(y))N = P(ω)∩C∗(y),
a is an enumeration of all the reals in C∗(y) and γ = ω
C∗(y)
1 . Hence C
∗(y) |=
CH .
Note that condition (ii) above is a Σ14-condition. Also, forgetting y, “C
∗ |=
CH” itself is a Σ14-sentence of set theory.
Using the above two Lemmas, we now prove a result which seems to lend
support to the idea that C∗ satisfies CH, at least assuming large cardinals. Let ≤T
be the Turing-reducibility relation between reals. The cone of a real x is the set
of all reals y with x ≤T y. A set of reals is called a cone if it is the cone of some
real. SupposeA is a projective set of reals closed under Turing-equivalence. If we
assume PD, then by a result of D. Martin [26] there is a cone which is included in
A or is disjoint from A.
Theorem 5.24. If there are three Woodin cardinals and a measurable cardinal
above them, then there is a cone of reals x such that C∗(x) satisfies the Continuum
Hypothesis.
Proof. We first observe that if two reals x and y are Turing-equivalent, then
C∗(x) = C∗(y). Hence the set
A = {y ⊆ ω : C∗(y) |= CH}
is closed under Turing-equivalence, and therefore by [27] amenable to the above
mentioned result by Martin on cones. We already know from Lemma 5.23 that the
set A is projective, in fact Σ14. Now we need to show that for every real x there is
a real y such that x ≤T y and y is in the set. Fix x. Let P be the standard forcing
which, in C∗(x), forces a subset B of ω
C∗(x)
1 , such that B codes, via the canonical
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pairing function in C∗(x), an onto mapping ω
C∗(x)
1 → P(ω) ∩ C
∗(x). Let B be
P-generic overC∗(x). Note that P does not add any new reals. Now we codeB by
a real by means of almost disjoint forcing. Let Zα, α < ω
C∗(x)
1 , be a sequence in
C∗(x) of almost disjoint subsets of ω. Let Q be the standard CCC-forcing, known
from [25], for adding a real y′ such that for all α < ω
C∗(x)
1 :
|zα ∩ y
′| ≥ ω ⇐⇒ α ∈ B.
Let y = x⊕ y′. Of course, x ≤T y. Now
C∗(x) ⊆ C∗(x)[B] ⊆ C∗(y).
By the definition of B, C∗(x)[B] |= CH . The forcing Q is of cardinality ℵ1 in
C∗(x)[B], hence C∗(y) |= CH .
Assuming large cardinals, the set of reals of C∗ seems like an interesting
countable Σ13-set with a Σ
1
3-well-ordering. It might be interesting to have a better
understanding of this set. This set is contained in the reals of the so called M ♯1 ,
the smallest inner model for a Woodin cardinal (M. Magidor and R. Schindler,
unpublished).
In Part 2 of this paper we will consider the so-called stationary logic [6], a
strengthening L(aa) of L(Qcfω ), and the arising inner model C(aa), a supermodel
of C∗. We will show that, assuming a proper class of measurable Woodin cardi-
nals, uncountable regular cardinals are measurable in C(aa), and the theory of
C(aa) is absolute under set forcing. These results remain true if we enhance the
expressive power of L(aa) slightly, and then the inner model arising from the
enhanced stationary logic satisfies the Continuum Hypothesis, assuming again a
proper class of measurable Woodin cardinals.
6 Consistency results about C∗
We define a version of Namba forcing that we call modified Namba forcing and
then use this to prove consistency results about C∗.
Suppose S = {λn : n < ω} is a sequence of regular cardinals > ω1 such that
every λn occurs infinitely many times in the sequence. Let 〈Bn : n < ω〉 be a
partition of ω into infinite sets.
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Definition 6.1. The forcing P is defined as follows: Conditions are trees T with ω
levels, consisting of finite sequences of ordinals, defined as follows: If (α0, . . . , αi) ∈
T , let
SucT ((α0, . . . , αi)) = {β : (α0, . . . , αi, β) ∈ T}.
The forcing P consists of trees, called S-trees, such that if (α0, . . . , αi) ∈ T and
i ∈ Bn, then
1. |SucT ((α0, . . . , αi−1))| ∈ {1, λn},
2. For every n there are αi, . . . , αk such that k ∈ Bn and |SucT ((α0, . . . , αk))| =
λn.
If |SucT ((α0, . . . , αi−1))| = λn, we call (α0, . . . , αi−1) a splitting point of T .
Otherwise (α0, . . . , αi−1) is a non-splitting point of T . The stem stem(T ) of T
is the maximal (finite) initial segment that consists of non-splitting points. If
s = (α0, . . . , αi) ∈ T , then
Ts = {(α0, . . . , αi, αi+1, . . . , αn) ∈ T : i ≤ n < ω}.
A condition T ′ extends another condition T , T ′ ≤ T , if T ′ ⊆ T . If 〈Tn : n < ω〉}
is a generic sequence of conditions, then the stems of the trees Tn form a sequence
〈αn : n < ω〉 such that 〈αi : i ∈ Bn〉 is cofinal in λn. Thus in the generic extension
cf(λn) = ω for all n < ω.
We shall now prove that no other regular cardinals get cofinality ω.
Proposition 6.2. Suppose κ /∈ S ∪ {ω} is regular. Then P  cf(κ) 6= ω.
Proof. Let us first prove that if τ is a name for an ordinal, then for all T ∈ P
there is T ∗ ≤ T such that stem(T ∗) = stem(T ) and if T ∗∗ ≤ T ∗ decides which
ordinal τ is, and s = stem(T ∗∗), then T ∗s decides τ . Suppose T is given and the
length of its stem is l ∈ Bn. Let us look at the level l + 1 of T . Let us call a node
s on level l + 1 of T good if the claim is true when T is taken to be Ts. Suppose
first there are λn good nodes. For each good s we choose T
∗(s) ≤ Ts such that
stem(T ∗(s)) = stem(Ts) and if some T
∗∗ ≤ T ∗(s) decides which ordinal τ is,
and s′ = stem(T ∗∗), then already T ∗(s)s′ decides τ . W.l.o.g. the length of such s
′
is a fixed k. We get the desired T ∗ by taking the fusion. Suppose then there are
not λn many good nodes. So there must be λn bad nodes. We repeat this process
on the next level. Suppose the process does not end. We get T ′ ≤ T consisting
of bad nodes. Since T forces that τ is an ordinal, there is T ′′ ≤ T ′ such that T ′′
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decides which ordinal τ is. We get a contradiction: the node of the stem of T ′′,
which is also a node of T ′, cannot be a bad one.
Suppose now 〈βn : n < ω〉 is a name for an ω-sequence of ordinals below κ,
and T ∈ P forces this. We construct T ∗ ≤ T and an ordinal δ < κ such that T ∗
forces the sequence 〈βn : n < ω〉 to be bounded below κ by δ. For each n we
have a partial function fn defined on s ∈ T of such that if Ts decides a value for
βn and then the value is defined to be fn(s). Let us call T good for 〈βn : n < ω〉
if for all infinite branches B through T and all n there is k such that fn restricted
to the initial segment of B of length k is defined. It follows from the above that
we can build, step by step a T ∗ ≤ T with the same stem as T such that T ∗ is good
for 〈βn : n < ω〉.
Without loss of generality, T itself is good for 〈βn : n < ω〉. Fix δ < κ.
We consider the following game Gδ. During the game the players determine an
infinite branch through T . If the game has reached node t on height k with k+1 ∈
Bn we consider two cases:
Case 1: κ > λn. Bad moves by giving an immediate successor of t.
Case 2: κ < λn. First Bad plays a subset A of (not necessarily immediate)
successors of t such that |A| < λn. Then Good moves a successor not in the
set.
Good player loses this game if at some stage of the game a member of the se-
quence βn is forced to go above δ. Note that the game is determined.
Main Claim: There is δ < κ such that Bad does not win Gδ (hence Good wins).
Proof. Assume the contrary, i.e. that Bad wins for all δ < κ. Let τδ be a strategy
for Bad for any given δ < κ. Let θ be a large enough cardinal and M ≺ Hθ such
that T,P, {βn : n < ω}, {λn : n < ω}, {(δ, τδ) : δ < κ} etc are in M , α ⊆ M
whenever α ∈M ∩κ and |M | < κ. Let δ = M ∩κ. We define a play ofGδ where
Bad uses τδ but all the individual moves are in M . Suppose we have reached a
node t of T such that len(t) = k and k + 1 ∈ Bn. If κ > λn, λn ⊆ M , so the
move of Bad is in M . Suppose then κ < λn. The strategy τδ tells Bad to play a
set A of successors (not necessarily immediate) of t such that |A| < λn. The next
move of Good has to avoid this set A. Still we want the move of Good to be in
M . We look at all the possibilities according to all the strategies τν , ν < κ. If the
play according to τν has reached t the strategy τν gives a set Aν of size < λn of
successors (not necessarily immediate) of t. Let B be the union of all these sets.
Still |B| < λn, as λn is regular. By elementarity, B ∈ M , hence Good can play
a successor of t staying in M . Since Bad is playing the winning strategy τδ, he
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should win this play. However, Good can play all the moves inside M without
losing. This is a contradiction.
Now we return to the main part of the proof. By theMain Claim there is δ such
that Good winsGδ. Let us look at the subtree of all plays ofGδ where Good plays
her winning strategy. A subtree T ∗ of T is generated and T ∗ forces the sequence
〈βn : n < ω〉 to be bounded by δ.
The above modified Namba forcing permits us to carry out the following basic
construction: Suppose V = L. Let us add a Cohen real r. We can code this real
with the above modified Namba forcing so that in the end for all n < ω:
cfV (ℵLn+2) = ω ⇐⇒ n ∈ r.
Thus in the extension r ∈ C∗.
Theorem 6.3. Con(ZF ) implies Con((C∗)C
∗
) 6= C∗).
Proof. We start with V = L. We add a Cohen real a. In the extension C∗ =
L, for cofinalities have not changed, so to decide whether cf(α) = ω or not it
suffices to decide this in L. With modified Namba forcing we can change—as
above—the cofinality of ℵLn+2 to ω according to whether n ∈ a or n /∈ a. In the
extension C∗ = L(a), for cofinality ω has only changed from L to the extent that
the cofinalities of ℵLn may have changed, but this we know by looking at a. Thus
(C∗)C
∗
= (C∗)L(a) = L, while C∗ 6= L. Thus (C∗)C
∗
6= C∗.
We now prepare ourselves to iterating this construction in order to code more
sets into C∗.
Definition 6.4 (Shelah). Suppose S = {λn : n < ω} is a sequence of regular
cardinals > ω1. A forcing notion P satisfies the S-condition if player II has
a super strategy (defined below) in the following came G in which the players
contribute a tree of finite sequences of ordinals:
1. There are two players I and II and ω moves.
2. In the start of the game player I plays a tree T0 of finite height and a function
f : T0 → P such that for all t, t′ ∈ T0: t <T0 t
′ ⇒ f(t′) <P f(t).
3. Then II decides what the successors of the top nodes of T0 are and extends
f .
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4. Player I extends the tree with non-splitting nodes of finite height and extends
f .
5. Then II decides what the successors of the top nodes are and extends f .
6. etc, etc
Player II wins if the resulting tree T is an S-tree (see Definition 6.1), and for every
S-subtree T ∗ of T there is a condition B∗ ∈ P such that
B∗  “The f -image of some branch through T ∗ is included in the generic set”.
A super strategy of II is a winning strategy in which the moves depend only on
the predecessors in T of the current node, as well as on their f -images.
By [35, Theorem 3.6] (see also [8, 2.1]), revised countable support iteration of
forcing with the S-condition does not collapse ℵ1.
Lemma 6.5. Modified Namba forcing satisfies the S-condition.
Proof. Suppose the game has progressed to the following:
1. A tree T has been constructed, as well as f : T → P .
2. Player I has played a non-splitting end-extension T ′ of T .
Suppose η is a maximal node in T ′. We are in stage n. Now II adds λn extensions
to η. Let E denote these extensions. Let B be the S-tree f(η). Find a node ρ in
B which is a splitting node and splits into λn nodes. Let g map the elements of E
1-1 to successors of ρ in B. Now we extend f to E by letting the image of e ∈ E
be the subtree Bη of B consisting of ρ and the predecessors of ρ extended by first
g(e) and then the subtree of B above g(e).
We can easily show that this is a super strategy. We show that II wins. Suppose
T is a tree resulting from II playing the above strategy. Let T ∗ be any S-subtree
of T . We construct an S-tree B∗ ∈ P as follows. Let B∗ be the union of all the
stems of the trees Bη, where η is a splitting point of T
∗. Clearly, B∗ is an S-tree.
To see that
B∗  “The f -image of some branch through T ∗ is included in the generic set”,
let G be a generic containing B∗. This generic is a branch γ through B∗. In view
of the definition of B∗, there is a branch β through T ∗ such that f“β = γ.
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Theorem 6.6. Suppose V = L and κ is a cardinal of cofinality > ω. There is a
forcing notion P which forces C∗ |= 2ω = κ and preserves cardinals between L
and C∗.
Proof. Suppose V = L. Let us add κ Cohen reals {rα : α < κ}. We code these
reals with revised countable support (see [35]) iterated modified Namba forcing
so that in the end we have a forcing extension in which for α < κ and n < ω:
cfV (ℵLω·α+n+2) = ω ⇐⇒ n ∈ rα.
Thus in the extension rα ∈ C∗ for all α < κ. We can now note that in the
extension C∗ = L[{rα : α < κ}]. First of all, each rα is in C∗. This gives “ ⊇ ”.
For the other direction, we note that whether an ordinal has cofinality ω in V can
be completely computed from the set {rα : α < κ}.
Note that the above theorem gives a model in which, e.g. C∗ |= 2ω = ℵ3, but
then in the extension |ℵC
∗
3 | = ℵ1, so certainly V 6= C
∗. Note also, that the above
theorem starts with V = L, so whether large cardinals, beyond those consistent
with V = L, decide CH in C∗, remains open.
Theorem 6.7. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) ZF+“there is an inaccessible cardinal” is consistent.
(ii) ZFC+“V = C∗ and 2ℵ0 = ℵ2” is consistent.
Proof. (i)→(ii): We start with an inaccessible κ and V = L. We iterate over
κ with revised countable support forcing adding Cohen reals and coding generic
sets using modified Namba forcing. Suppose we are at a stage α and we need to
code a real r. We choose ω uncountable cardinals below κ and code the real r by
changing the cofinality of some of these cardinals to ω. We do this only if at stage
α we already have enough reals in order to code the new ω-sequences by reals. In
the end all the reals are coded by changing cofinalities to ω, and at the same time
the ω-sequences witnessing the cofinalities are coded by reals. In consequence
we have in the end V = C∗. The iteration satisfies the S-condition, hence ℵ1 is
preserved, but the cardinals used for coding the reals all collapse to ℵ1. Hence κ
is the new ℵ2. In the extension 2
ℵ0 = ℵ2 and V = C
∗.
(ii)→(i): Suppose V = C∗ and C∗ |= “2ω ≥ ωV2 ” but ω
V
2 is not inaccessible in
L. Then ωV2 = (λ
+)L for some L-cardinal λ. Let A ⊆ ωV1 such that A codes the
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countability of all ordinals < ωV1 and also codes a well-ordering of ω1 of order-
type λ. Now L[A] |= ωV1 = ω1 ∧ ω
V
2 = ω2. We show now that (C
∗)L[A] = C∗.
For this to hold it suffices to show that L[A] agrees with V about cofinality ω.
If α has cofinality ω in L[A], then trivially it has cofinality ω in V . Suppose
then L[A] |= cf(α) > ω. If α < ωV2 , then L[A] |= α < ω2, whence L[A] |=
cf(α) = ω1. Since ω
L[A]
1 = ω
V
1 , we obtain cf(α) = ω1. Suppose therefore
α ≥ ωV2 , but cf
V (α) = ω. Note that we can assume ¬0♯, because otherwise ωV2 is
inaccessible in L already by the general properties of 0♯. By the Covering Lemma,
a consequence of ¬0♯, we have L[A] |= cf(α) ≤ ω1. Since L[A] |= cf(α) > ω,
we obtain L[A] |= cf(α) = ω1, and since ω
L[A]
1 = ω1, we have cf
V (α) = ω1. This
finishes our proof that (C∗)L[A] = C∗. Note that L[A] satisfies CH . On the other
hand, we have assumed that there are ℵV2 reals in C
∗. Thus there are ℵ2 reals in
(C∗)L[A] ⊆ L[A], a contradiction.
7 Higher order logics
The basic result about higher order logics, proved in [32], is that they give rise
to the inner model HOD of hereditarily ordinal definable sets. In this section we
show that this result enjoys some robustness, i.e. ostensibly much weaker logics
than second order logic still give rise to HOD.
Theorem 7.1 (Myhill-Scott [32]). C(L2) = HOD.
Proof. We give the proof for completeness. We show HOD ⊆ C(L2). Let X ∈
HOD. There is a first order ϕ(x, ~y) and ordinals ~β such that for all a
a ∈ X ⇐⇒ ϕ(a, ~β).
By Levy Reflection there is an α such that X ⊆ Vα and for all a ∈ Vα
a ∈ X ⇐⇒ Vα |= ϕ(a, ~β).
Since we proceed by induction, we may assume X ⊆ C(L2). Let γ be such that
X ⊆ L′γ . We can choose γ so big that |L
′
γ| ≥ |Vα|. We show now that X ∈ L
′
γ+1.
We give a second order formula Φ(x, y, ~z) such that
X = {a ∈ L′γ : L
′
γ |= Φ(a, α, ~β)}.
We know
X = {a ∈ L′γ : Vα |= ϕ(a, ~β)}.
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Intuitively, X is the set of a ∈ L′γ such that in L
′
γ some (M,E, a
∗, α∗, ~β∗) ∼=
(Vα,∈, a, α, ~β) satisfies ϕ(a∗, ~β∗). Let θ(x, y, ~z) be a second order formula of the
vocabulary {E} such that for any M , E ⊆ M2 and a∗, α∗, ~β∗ ∈ M : (M,E) |=
θ(a∗, α∗, ~β∗) iff there are an isomorphism π : (M,E) ∼= (Vδ,∈) such that π :
(α∗, E) ∼= (δ,∈), and (Vδ,∈) |= ϕ(π(a
∗), π(~β)).
We conclude X ∈ L′γ+1 by proving the:
Claim The following are equivalent for a ∈ L′γ :
(1) a ∈ X .
(2) L′γ |= ∃M,E(TC({a}) ∪ α + 1 ∪ ~β ∪ {~β} ⊆ M ∧ (M,E) |= θ(a, α, ~β))}.
(1)→ (2) : Suppose a ∈ X . Thus Vα |= ϕ(a, ~β). LetM ⊆ L′γ and E ⊆ M
2 such
that α + 1,TC(a), ~β ∈M and there is an isomorphism
f : (Vα,∈, α, a, ~β) ∼= (M,E, α
∗, a∗, ~β∗).
We can assume α∗ = α, a∗ = a and ~β∗ = ~β by doing a partial Mostowski collapse
for (M,E). So then (M,E) |= ϕ(a, ~β), whence (M,E) |= θ(a, α, ~β). We have
proved (2).
(2)→ (1) : SupposeM ⊆ L′γ andE ⊆M
2 such that TC({a})∪α+1∪~β∪{~β} ⊆
M and (M,E) |= θ(a, α, ~β). We may assumeE ↾ TC({a})∪α+1∪~β∪{~β} =∈↾
TC({a})∪α+1∪ ~β ∪ {~β}. There is an isomorphism π : (M,E) ∼= (Vα,∈) such
that (Vα,∈) |= ϕ(π(a), π(~β)). But π(a) = a and π(~β) = ~β. So in the end
(Vα,∈) |= ϕ(a, ~β). We have proved (1).
In second order logicL2 one can quantify over arbitrary subsets of the domain.
A more general logic is obtained as follows:
Definition 7.2. Let F be any class function on cardinal numbers. The logic L2,F
is like L2 except that the second order quantifiers range over a domain M over
subsets ofM of cardinality ≤ κ whenever F (κ) ≤ |M |.
Examples of possible functions are F (κ) = 0, κ, κ+, 2κ, ℵκ, iκ, etc. Note
that L2 = L2,F whenever F (κ) ≤ κ for all κ. The logic L2,F is weaker the
bigger values F (κ) takes on. For example, if F (κ) = 22
κ
, the second order
variables ofL2,F range over “tiny” subsets of the universe. Philosophically second
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order logic is famously marred by the difficulty of imagining how a universally
quantified variable could possibly range over all subsets of an infinite domain. If
the universally quantified variable ranges only over “tiny” size subsets, one can
conceivably think that there is some coding device which uses the elements of the
domain to code all the “tiny” subsets.
Inspection of the proof of Theorem 7.1 reveals that actually the followingmore
general fact holds:
Theorem 7.3. For all F : C(L2,F ) = HOD.
LetL2κ denote the modification ofL
2 in which the second order variables range
over subsets (relations, functions, etc) of cardinality at most κ.
Theorem 7.4. Suppose 0♯ exists. Then 0♯ ∈ C(L2κ)
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 5.3.
A consequence of Theorem 7.3 is the following:
Conclusion: The second order constructible hierarchy C(L2) = HOD is unaf-
fected if second order logic is modified in any of the following ways:
• Extended in any way to a logic definable with hereditarily ordinal definable
parameters. This includes third order logic, fourth order logic, etc.
• Weakened by allowing second order quantification in domainM only over
subsetsX such that 2|X| ≤ |M |.
• Weakened by allowing second order quantification in domainM only over
subsetsX such that 22
|X|
≤ |M |.
• Any combination of the above.
Thus Go¨del’s HOD = C(L2) has some robustness as to the choice of the logic L2.
It is the common feature of the logics that yield HOD that they are able to express
quantification over all subsets of some part of the universe the size of which is
not a priori bounded. We can perhaps say, that this is the essential feature of
second order logic that results in C(L2) being HOD. What is left out are logics
in which one can quantify over, say all countable subsets. Let us call this logic
L2ℵ0 . Consistently
9, C(L2ℵ0) 6= HOD. Many would call a logic such as L
2
ℵ0
second
order.
9Assume V = L and add a Cohen subset X of ω1. Now code X into HOD with countably
closed forcing using [28]. In the resulting model C(L2ℵ0 ) = L 6= HOD.
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Let Σ1n denote the fragment of second order logic in which the formulas have,
if in prenex normal form with second order quantifiers preceding all first order
quantifiers, only n second order quantifier alternations, the first second order
quantifier being existential. Note that trivially C(Σ1n) = C(Π
1
n). Let us write
HODn =df C(Σ
1
n).
The Myhill-Scott proof shows that HODn = HOD for n ≥ 2. What about HOD1?
Note that for all β and A ∈ HOD1:
• {α < β : cfV (α) = ω} ∈ HOD1
• {(a, b) ∈ A2 : |a|V ≤ |b|V } ∈ HOD1
• {α < β : α cardinal in V } ∈ HOD1
• {(α0, α1) ∈ β2 : |α0|V ≤ (2|α1|)V } ∈ HOD1
• {α < β : (2|α|)V = (|α|+)V } ∈ HOD1
These examples show that HOD1 contains most if not all of the inner models
considered above. In particular we have:
Lemma 7.5. 1. C∗ ⊆ HOD1.
2. C(QMM,<ω1 ) ⊆ HOD1
3. If 0♯ exists, then 0♯ ∈ HOD1
Naturally, HOD1 = HOD is consistent, since we only need to assume V = L.
So we focus on HOD1 6= HOD.
Theorem 7.6. It is consistent, relative to the consistency of infinitely many weakly
compact cardinals that for some λ:
{κ < λ : κ weakly compact (in V )} /∈ HOD1,
and, moreover, HOD1 = L 6= HOD.
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Proof. Let us assume V = L. Let κn, n < ω be a sequence of weakly compact
cardinals. Let Dδ be the forcing notion for adding a Cohen subset of the regular
cardinal δ. Let λ = supn κn. We proceed as in [18]. Let η < κ be two regular
cardinals. We denote by Rη,κ the Easton support iteration of Dδ for η ≤ δ ≤ κ.
The forcing Rκ+n−1,κn
, where for n = 0 we take κ−1 = ω1, we denote by Pn. Note
that forcing with Pn preserves the weak compactness of κn. Let Dn be the name
for the forcing Dκn defined in V
Pn . Note that Pn ∗Dκn is forcing equivalent to Pn.
Let Q be the full support product of Pn, n < ω. Let V
∗ = V Q.
Claim. For every n < ω the cardinal κn is weakly compact in V
∗.
The argument uses the fact that for each n the forcing Q can be decomposed
as Qn × Pn ×Q
n where Qn has cardinality κn−1 and Q
n is κ+n closed. Hence Qn
and Qn do not change the weak compactness of κn, which is preserved by Pn.
As in [18], we define in V Pn a forcing Sn to be the canonical forcing which
introduces a κn homogeneous Soulin tree. In particular it kills the weak com-
pactness of κn. Let Tn be the forcing which introduces a branch through the tree
forced by Sn. As in [18] we can show that Sn ∗ Tn is forcing equivalent to Dκn .
Therefore if we force with Tn over V
Pn∗Sn , we regain the weak compactness of
κn. Also a generic object for Dκn introduces a generic object for Tn.
We are going to describe three models V1 ⊆ V2 ⊆ V3. Let first V
∗
1 = L
Q .
Let Gn be the generic filter in Pn, introduced by Q. The model V
∗
3 is the model
one gets from V ∗1 by forcing over it with the full support product of Dκn . (Dn
is as realized according to Gn.). Let Hn ⊆ Dn be the generic filter introduced
by this forcing. Note that V ∗3 can also be obtained from L by forcing with Q.
In particular both in V1 and in V
∗
3 the cardinals κn are weakly compact for every
n < ω. Let V3 be an extension of V
∗
3 by adding a Cohen real a ⊆ ω. Let A be
the Cohen forcing on ω. Then define V1 = V
∗
1 (a). Both V1 and V3 are obtained
by forcing over L with Q × A which is a homogenous forcing notion. Hence
HODV1 = HODV3 = L. Again we did not kill the weak compactness of the
cardinals κn.
Now we define V2. Each Hn introduces a generic filter for the forcing Sn (As
defined according to Gn). Let Kn ⊆ Sn be this generic filter. We define
V2 = V1[a, 〈Kn|n 6∈ a〉, 〈Hn|n ∈ a〉].
For n < ω we define an auxiliary universeWn as follows:
Wn = L(a, 〈Gi|i ≤ n〉, 〈Ki|i ≤ n, i 6∈ a〉, 〈Hi|i ≤ n, i ∈ a〉).
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If n ∈ a then Wn is obtained from L by a product of Pn ∗ Dn and some forcings
of size < κn. Since Pn ∗ Dn preserves the weak compactness of κn, κn is weakly
compact in Wn. If n 6∈ a then Kn generates a tree on κn which is still Souslin in
Wn. (Small forcings do not change the Souslinity of a tree.), So κn is not weakly
compact inWn. We proved:
Claim. κn is weakly compact inWn iff n ∈ a.
The following claim follows from the standard arguments analysing the power-
set of a cardinal δ under a forcing which is the product of a forcing of size µ < δ,
a forcing of size δ which is µ+-distributive, and a forcing which is δ+-distributive.
Claim. For n < ω P (κn)
V2 = P (κn)
Wn .
From the last two claims it follows that
V2 |= a = {n < ω|κn is weakly compact}.
Therefore a ∈ HODV2 .
The proof of the Theorem will be finished if we show that HODV21 = L. For
an ordinal α let L1α, L
2
α, L
3
α be the α-th step of the construction of (C(Σ
1
1))
V1 ,
(C(Σ11))
V1 , (C(Σ11))
V3 respectively.
Lemma 7.7. For every α L1α = L
2
α = L
3
α.
The proof of the lemma is by induction on α where the cases α = 0 and
α limit are obvious. So given α, by the induction assumption on α we can put
M = L1α = L
2
α = L
3
α. Note thatM ∈ L sinceM ∈ HOD
V1 = L. Let Φ(~x) be a
Σ11 formula and let
~b be a vector of elements ofM .
Lemma 7.8. The following are equivalent
1. (M |= Φ(~b))V1
2. (M |= Φ(~b))V3
3. (M |= Φ(~b))V2
Without loss of generality, Φ(~x) has the form ∃XΨ(X,~x), where X is a sec-
ond order variable and all the quantifiers of Ψ are first order. Both V1 and V3 are
obtained form L by forcing over L withQ×A. This forcing is homogeneous. M
and all the elements of the vector~b are in L. So (1) is clearly equivalent to (2).
Now suppose that (M |= Φ(~b))V2 . Let Z ⊆ M be the witness for the exis-
tential quantifier of Φ. Then (M |= Ψ(Z,~b))V2 . But all the quantifiers of Ψ are
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first order, so (M |= Ψ(Z,~b))V3 . So (3) implies (2), and hence (1). For the other
direction, if (M |= Φ(~b))V3 , then we know that (M |= Φ(~b))V1 . Let Z ∈ V1 satisfy
M |= Ψ(Z,~b). So (M |= Ψ(Z,~b))V2 , and therefore (M |= Φ(~b))V2 .
It follows from the lemma that every Σ11 formula defines the same subset ofM
in V1, V2 and V3. It follows that L
1
α+1 = L
2
α+1 = L
3
α+1.
This proves the lemma and the theorem.
The above proof works also with “weakly compact” replaced by other large
cardinal properties, e.g. “measurable” or “supercompact”. We can start, for exam-
ple, with a ω supercompact cardinals, code each one of them into cardinal expo-
nentiation, detectible by means of HOD1, above all of them, without losing their
supercompactness or introducing new supercompact cardinals, and then proceed
as in the proof of Theorem 7.6. Note that we can also start with a supercompact
cardinal and code, using the method of [29], every set into cardinal exponentia-
tion, detectible by means of HOD1, without losing the supercompact cardinal. In
the final model there is a super compact cardinal while V = HOD1.
We shall now prove an analogue of Theorem 7.6 without assuming any large
cardinals. Let C(κ) be Cohen forcing for adding a subset for a regular cardinal κ.
Let R(κ) be the statement that there is a bounded subset A ⊆ κ and a set C ⊆ κ
which is C(κ)-generic over L[A], such that P(κ) ⊆ L[A,C].
Theorem 7.9. It is consistent, relative to the consistency of ZFC that:
{n < ω : R(ℵn)} /∈ HOD1,
and, moreover, HOD1 = L 6= HOD.
Proof. The proof is very much like the proof of Theorem 7.6 so we only indicate
the necessary modifications. Let us assume V = L. As a preliminary forcing C
we apply Cohen forcing Cn = C(ℵn) for each ℵn (including ℵ0) adding a Cohen
subset Cn ⊆ ℵn \ {0, 1}. W.l.o.g. min(Cn+1) > ℵn. Let V1 denote the extension.
Let P be the product forcing in V1 which adds a non-reflecting stationary set An
to κn, n /∈ C0, by means of:
Pn = {p : γ → 2 : ℵn−1 < γ < ℵn, ∀α < γ(cf(α) > ω →
{β < α : p(β) = 0} is non-stationary in α)}.
Let us note that Pn is strategically ℵn−1-closed, for the second player can play
systematically at limits in such a way that during the game a club is left out of
{β : p(β) = 0}. Let V2 denote the extension of V1 by P. Now
V2 |= C0 = {n < ω : R(ℵn)},
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for if n ∈ C0, then R(ℵn) holds in V2 by construction, and on the other hand,
if n /∈ C0, then R(ℵn) fails in V2 because one can show with a back-and-forth
argument that with P and C as above, we always have V P 6= V C.
LetQ force in V2 a club intoAn, n ∈ Cω, by closed initial segments with a last
element. The crucial observation now is that Pn ⋆ Qn is the same forcing as Cn.
To see this, it suffices to find a dense ℵn−1-closed subset of Pn ⋆Qn of cardinality
ℵn. Let D consist of pairs (p, A) ∈ Pn ⋆Cn such that dom(p) = max(A) + 1 and
∀β ∈ A(p(β) = 1). This set is clearly ℵn−1-closed.
Proposition 7.10. If 0♯ exists, then 0♯ ∈ C(∆11), hence C(∆
1
1) 6= L.
Proof. As Proposition 5.3.
8 Semantic extensions of ZFC
For another kind of application of extended logics in set theory we consider the
following concept:
Definition 8.1. Suppose L∗ is an abstract logic. We use ZFC(L∗) to denote the
usual ZFC-axioms in the vocabulary {∈} with the modification that the formula
ϕ(x, ~y) in the Schema of Separation
∀x∀x1...∀xn∃y∀z(z ∈ y ↔ (z ∈ x ∧ ϕ(z, ~x)))
and the formula ψ(u, z, ~x) in the Schema of Replacement
∀x∀x1...∀xn(∀u∀z∀z
′((u ∈ x ∧ ψ(u, z, ~x) ∧ ψ(u, z′, ~x))→ z = z′)
→ ∃y∀z(z ∈ y ↔ ∃u(u ∈ x ∧ ψ(u, z, ~x)))).
is allowed to be taken from L∗.
The concept of a a model (M,E), E ⊆ M × M , satisfying the axioms
ZFC(L∗) is obviously well-defined. Note that ZFC(L∗) is at least as strong as
ZFC in the sense that every model of ZFC(L∗) is, a fortiori, a model of ZFC.
The class of (set) models of ZFC is, of course, immensely rich, ZFC being a
first order theory. If ZFC is consistent, we have countable models, uncountable
models, well-founded models, non-well-founded models etc. We now ask the
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question, what can we say about the models of ZFC(L∗) for various logics L∗?
Almost by definition, the inner model C(L∗) is a class model of ZFC(L∗):
C(L∗) |= ZFC(L∗).
But ZFC(L∗) can very well have other models.
Theorem 8.2. A model of ZFC is a model of ZFC(L(Q0)) if and only if it is an
ω-model.
Proof. Suppose first (M,E) is an ω-model of ZFC. Then we can eliminate Q0 in
(M,E): Given a first order formula ϕ(x,~a) with some parameters ~a there is, by
the Axiom of Choice, either a one-one function from
{b ∈M : (M,E) |= ϕ(b,~a)} (10)
onto a natural number of (M,E) or onto an ordinal of (M,E) which is infinite in
(M,E). Since (M,E) is an ω-model, these two alternatives correspond exactly
to (10) being finite (in V) or infinite (in V). So Q0 has, in (M,E), a first order
definition. For the converse, suppose (M,E) is a model of ZFC(L(Q0)) but some
element a in ω(M,E) has infinitely many predecessors in V . By using the Schema
of Separation, applied to L(Q0), we can define the set B ∈ M of elements a
in ω(M,E) that have infinitely many predecessors in V . Hence we can take the
smallest element of B in (M,E). This is clearly a contradiction.
In similar way one can show that a model of ZFC is a model of ZFC(L(Q1))
if and only if it its set of ordinals is ℵ1-like or it has an ℵ1-like cardinal.
Theorem 8.3. A model of ZFC is a model of ZFC(L(QMM0 )) if and only if it is
well-founded.
Proof. Suppose first (M,E) is a well-founded model of ZFC. Then we can elim-
inate QMM0 in (M,E) because it is absolute: The existence of an infinite set X
such that every pair from the set satisfies a given first-order formula can be writ-
ten as the non-well-foundedness of a relation in M and non-well-foundedness
is an absolute property in transitive models. For the converse, suppose (M,E)
is a model of ZFC(L(QMM0 )). Since Q0 is definable from Q
MM
0 we can assume
(M,E) is an ω-model and ω(M,E) = ω. Suppose some ordinal a in (M,E) is
non-well-founded. To reach a contradiction it suffices to show that the set of such
a is L(QMM0 )-definable in (M,E). Let ϕ(x, y, z) be the first order formula of the
language of set theory which says:
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• x = 〈x1, x2〉, y = 〈y1, y2〉
• x1, x2 < ω, y1, y2 < a
• x1 6= x2
• x1 < x2 → y2 < y1.
Let us first check that QMM0 xyϕ(x, y, a) holds in (M,E). Let (an) be a decreasing
sequence (in V ) of elements of a. Let X be the set of pairs 〈n, an〉, where n < ω.
By construction, any pair 〈x, y〉 in [X ]2 satisfies ϕ(x, y, a). ThusQMM0 xyϕ(x, y, a)
holds in (M,E). For the converse, suppose QMM0 xyϕ(x, y, b) holds in (M,E).
Let Y be an infinite set such that every 〈x, y〉 in [Y ]2 satisfies ϕ(x, y, b). Every
two pairs in Y have a different natural number as the first component. So we can
choose pairs from Y where the first components increase. But then the second
components decrease and b has to be non-well-founded.
Theorem 8.4. A structure is a model of ZFC(Lω1ω) if and only if it is isomorphic
to a transitive a modelM of ZFC such thatMω ⊆ M .
Proof. Suppose firstM is a transitive a model of ZFC such thatMω ⊆ M . Then
we can eliminate Lω1ω because the semantics of Lω1ω is absolute in transitive
models and the assumptionMω ⊆M guarantees that all the Lω1ω-formulas of the
language of set theory are elements ofM . For the converse, suppose (M,E) is a
model of ZFC(Lω1ω). Since Q0 is definable in Lω1ω, we may assume that (M,E)
is an ω-model and ω(M,E) = ω. Suppose (an) is a sequence (in V ) of elements of
M . Let
ϕ(x, y, u0, u1, . . . , z0, z1, . . .)
be the Lω1ω-formula ∧
n
(x = un → y = zn).
Note that (M,E) satisfies
∀x ∈ ω∃yϕ(x, y, 0, 1, . . . , a0, a1, . . .).
If we apply the Schema of Replacement of ZFC(Lω1ω), we get an element b ofM
which has all the an as its elements. By a similar application of the Schema of
Separation we get {an : n ∈ ω} ∈ M . ThusM is closed under ω-sequences and
in particular it is well-founded.
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By a similar argument one can see that the only model of the class size theory
ZFC(L∞ω) is the class size model V itself. This somewhat extreme example
shows that by going far enough along this line eventually gives everything. One
can also remark that the class of models of ZFC(Lω1ω1) is exactly the same as the
class of models of ZFC(Lω1ω). This is because in transitive models M such that
Mω ⊆M also the truth of Lω1ω1-sentences is absolute. So despite their otherwise
huge difference, the logics Lω1ω and Lω1ω1 do not differ in the current context.
Second order logic is again an interesting case. Note that ZFC(L2) is by no
means the same as the so-called second order ZFC, or ZFC2 as it is denoted.
We have not changed the Separation and Replacement Schemas into a second or-
der form, we have just allowed second order formulas to be used in the schemas
instead of first order formulas. So, although the models of ZFC2 are, up to iso-
morphism, of the form Vκ, and are therefore, a fortiori, also models of ZFC(L
2),
we shall see below that models of ZFC(L2) need not be of that form.
Theorem 8.5. Assume V = L. A structure is a model of ZFC(L2) if and only if it
is isomorphic to a modelM of ZFC of the form Lκ where κ is inaccessible.
Proof. First of all, if V = L and Lκ |= ZFC, where κ is inaccessible, then trivially
Lκ |= ZFC(L2). For the converse, suppose (M,E) |= ZFC(L2). Because QMM0 is
definable in L2, we may assume (M,E) is a transitive model (M,∈).
We first observe that the model M satisfies V = L. To this end, suppose
α ∈ M and x ∈ M is a subset of α. Let β be minimal β such that x ∈ Lβ .
There is a binary relation on α, second order definable over M , with order type
β. By the second order Schema of Separation this relation is in the modelM . So
M |= “x ∈ Lβ”. HenceM |= V = L. LetM = Lα. It is easy to see that α has to
be an inaccessible cardinal.
Note that if 0# exists, then 0# is in every transitive model of ZFC(L2).
If there is an inaccessible cardinal κ and we add a Cohen real, then ZFC(L2)
has a transitive modelM which is not of the form Vα, namely the Vκ of the ground
model. By the homogeneity of Cohen-forcing this model is a model of ZFC(L2)
but, of course, it is not Vκ of the forcing extension. This is a consequence of
the homogeneity of Cohen forcing. Note that M is not a model of ZFC2, the
second order ZFC, in which the Separation and Replacement Schemas of ZFC
are replaced by their second order versions, making ZFC2 a finite second order
theory. Here we have an example where ZFC2 6= ZFC(L2).
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9 Open Questions
This topic abounds in open questions. We mention here what we think as the most
urgent:
1. Can C∗ contain measurable cardinals? Note that there are no measurable
cardinals if V = C∗ (Theorem 5.7).
2. Does C∗ satisfy CH, if V has large cardinals? Note that if there are large
cardinals then the relativized version C∗(x) of C∗ satisfies CH for a cone of
reals x (Theorem 5.24).
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